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ABSTRACT 
The “reasonable expectation of privacy” test, which defines the scope of constitutional protection 
from governmental privacy intrusions in both the United States and Canada, is notoriously 
indeterminate. This indeterminacy stems in large measure from the tendency of judges to think 
of privacy in non-instrumentalist terms. This “moral” approach to privacy is normatively 
questionable, and it does a poor job of identifying the circumstances in which privacy should 
prevail over countervailing interests, such as the deterrence of crime.  
 
In this paper, I develop an alternative, economically-informed approach to the reasonable 
expectation of privacy test. In contrast to the moral approach, which treats privacy as a 
fundamental right, the economic approach views it as a (normatively neutral) aspect of self-
interest: the desire to conceal and control potentially damaging personal information. On this 
view, privacy should not be protected when its primary effect is to impede the optimal deterrence 
of crime. Legal protections against governmental surveillance, however, may in other cases 
enhance social welfare by encouraging productive transactions, diminishing the costs of non-
legal privacy barriers, and limiting suboptimal policing practices, including discriminatory 
profiling and the enforcement of inefficient criminal prohibitions. Economics and public choice 
theory can also help to minimize decision-making error by predicting which legal actors – police, 
legislatures, or courts – are best placed to make optimal trade-offs between privacy and crime 
control.  
 
I first describe the United States and Canadian supreme courts’ reasonable expectation of privacy 
jurisprudence and canvass its chief inadequacy: the vagueness of the “public exposure” and 
“intimacy” doctrines that the courts have used to decide whether to regulate novel search 
technologies. I then outline the economic approach to the reasonable expectation of privacy test. 
Next, I apply this approach to two technologically advanced search tools: infrared imaging and 
location tracking. This analysis suggests that courts should recognize a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the latter case, but not the former. 
I INTRODUCTION 
In both the United States and Canada, the reasonable expectation of privacy test defines 
the scope of constitutional protection from governmental privacy intrusions. When a court 
decides that a person has no reasonable expectation of privacy in relation to an investigative 
technique, there is no “search” or “seizure” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution1 or section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.2 In 
such cases, police are free (absent any statutory restriction) to use the technique without first 
obtaining a warrant or establishing individualized suspicion.3 When there is a reasonable 
expectation of privacy, in contrast, police must generally obtain a warrant based on probable 
cause before conducting the search.4
Unfortunately, the jurisprudence that American and Canadian courts have developed in 
applying the reasonable expectation of privacy test is notoriously circular, imprecise, and 
unpredictable.5 In this article, I argue that this indeterminacy stems in large measure from the 
 
1 “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath 
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. 
CONST. amend. IX (“Fourth Amendment”). 
2 “Everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure.” CAN. CONST. (Constitution 
Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms), § 8. 
3 See generally United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); R. v. Duarte, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 30, 42 (Can.); R. 
v. Wong, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 36, 47 (Can.). 
4 In Canada, the equivalent terminology is “reasonable and probable grounds.” See Hunter v. Southam Inc., 
[1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 at 167 (Can.) (“The state’s interest in detecting and preventing crime begins to prevail over the 
individual's interest in being left alone at the point where credibly-based probability replaces suspicion.”). Courts 
have not consistently articulated a precise or quantifiable definition of “probable.” Some courts have treated it as 
equivalent to “more likely than not,” but others have suggested that it signifies a lesser degree of probability. See 
WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 149-50 (3d ed. 2000); R.E. SALHANY, CANADIAN CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE ¶ 3.1140 (6th ed. 2005). Courts in both nations have also recognized many circumstances in which, 
despite the existence of a reasonable expectation of privacy, the constitution does not require warrants, probable 
cause, or either. In some situations police may obtain warrants or conduct warrantless searches on the basis of a 
lesser standard of suspicion (often called “reasonable suspicion”). See LAFAVE, supra, at 148; JAMES A. FONTANA,
THE LAW OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE IN CANADA 458-59, 552-55, 595-97 (6th ed. 2005). 
5 See e.g. 1WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, 393-94 
(3d ed., 1996); Richard Posner, The Uncertain Protection of Privacy by the Supreme Court, 1979 SUP. CT. REV.
tendency of judges to think of privacy in non-instrumentalist terms. Courts typically view 
privacy as a fundamental right, rooted in notions of dignity, autonomy, identity, personality, or 
liberty.6 And while they often acknowledge the existence of countervailing interests, they 
generally treat privacy as an unalloyed social good.7
There are several problems with this approach, which I refer to as the “moral” conception 
of privacy. First, casting privacy as a moral right is normatively questionable.8 It is not at all 
clear that privacy is as central to human flourishing as most deontologically-oriented jurists 
claim.9 Second, to the extent that it is important, the moral approach does a poor job of 
identifying the circumstances in which privacy should prevail over countervailing interests, such 
as the deterrence of crime. Third, neither the Fourth Amendment nor section 8 of the Charter 
protects privacy in a “fundamental” manner; they protect only the right to be free from 
“unreasonable” searches and seizures.10 Even gross privacy invasions may be justified when the 
state can show that they are likely to reveal evidence of serious crimes.11 As courts in both 
 
173, 188. 
6 See e.g. Edward Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 962 (1964); Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475 (1968); Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits 
of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421 (1980). 
7 See Anita L. Allen, Privacy-as-Data Control: Conceptual, Practical, and Moral Limits of the Paradigm, 
32 CONN. L. REV. 861, 871 (2000) (“Liberals have generally assumed that privacy is something people want and 
that the main goal of public policy is to enhance their capacity to get what they want.”); Duarte [1990] 1 S.C.R. at 
429, quoting TASK FORCE ON PRIVACY AND COMPUTERS, PRIVACY AND COMPUTERS: A REPORT OF A TASK FORCE 
ESTABLISHED JOINTLY BY DEPT. OF COMMUNICATIONS/DEPT. OF JUSTICE 13 (1972) (“all information about a person 
is in a fundamental way his own, for him to communicate or retain for himself as he sees fit.”). See also ALAN F. 
WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967). 
8 The literature is replete with debates over the core meaning or meanings of privacy. See generally Daniel 
J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1087 (2002); Comment, A Taxonomy of Privacy: Repose,
Sanctuary, and Intimate Decision, 64 CAL. L. REV. 1447 (1976). The chief concern of this paper is informational 
privacy (i.e. privacy of personal information), which is the key privacy interest implicated by government use of 
advanced search and surveillance technologies. See generally Duarte, [1990] 1 S.C.R. at 429-30. 
9 See Richard Posner, The Right To Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393, 406-09 (1978). 
10 See Silas J. Wasserstrom & Louis Michael Seidman, The Fourth Amendment as Constitutional Theory,
77 GEO. L.J. 19, 61-62 (1988). 
11 See e.g. R. v. Simmons, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 495 at 517 (Can.) (recognizing that invasive bodily cavity 
searches would require “greater” justification than routine pat-down and strip searches). 
countries have recognized, constitutional search and seizure decisions (including threshold 
reasonable expectation of privacy determinations) call for some kind of instrumentalist cost-
benefit calculation.12 Yet by conceptualizing privacy in moral terms, courts have largely failed to 
perform this calculation with rigour, clarity, or transparency.  
 The intent of this article, then, is to develop a fully instrumentalist approach to the 
reasonable expectation of privacy test. The obvious place to start is economic analysis. There is a 
flourishing literature on the law and economics of privacy. Drawing mostly from the economics 
of information,13 legal economists have taken on a wide variety of privacy issues.14 There have 
been few attempts, however, to apply economic insights to search and seizure law.15 This article 
aims to help fill this gap. I provide an accounting of the costs and benefits of governmental 
privacy intrusions and propose a framework for making reasonable expectation of privacy 
decisions that maximize social welfare.  
 In contrast to the prevailing moral approach, which treats privacy as a fundamental right, 
 
12 See Hunter, [1984] 2 S.C.R at 159-60 (The reasonable expectation of privacy test is an assessment “as to 
whether in a particular situation the public’s interest in being left alone by government must give way to the 
government’s interest in intruding on the individual’s privacy in order to advance its goals, notably those of law 
enforcement.”); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 181 (1984) (stressing the need to find “a workable 
accommodation between the needs of law enforcement and the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment.”); 
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979) (“the permissibility of a particular law enforcement practice is judged 
by balancing its intrusion on ... Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental 
interests.”); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967) (“There can be no ready test for determining 
reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search against the invasion which the search entails.”). See also 
Morgan Cloud, Pragmatism, Positivism, and Principles in Fourth Amendment Theory, 41 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 199, 
234-36 (1993). 
13 See e.g. THE ANALYTICS OF UNCERTAINTY AND INFORMATION (Jack Hirshleifer, et al. eds., 1992); INES 
MACHO-STADLER ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO THE ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION: INCENTIVES AND CONTRACTS,
(2d ed., 2001).  
14 See generally David Friedman, Privacy and Technology, 17 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 186 (2000); JACK 
HIRSHLEIFER, ECONOMIC BEHAVIOUR IN ADVERSITY 194-210 (1987); Posner, supra note 9; George Stigler, The Law 
and Economics of Privacy, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 623 (1980). 
15 Exceptions include Andrew Song, Technology, Terrorism, and the Fishbowl Effect: An Economic 
Analysis of Surveillance and Searches (2003) at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=422220; Hugo M. Mialon & Sue H. 
Mialon, The Economics of the Fourth Amendment: Crime, Search, and Anti-Utopia (2004) at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=591667; Craig S. Lerner, The Reasonableness of Probable Cause, 81 TEX. L. REV. 951 
the economic approach views it as a (normatively neutral) aspect of self-interest: the desire to 
conceal and control potentially damaging personal information. On this view, privacy should not 
be protected when its primary effect is to impede the optimal deterrence of crime. Legal 
protections against governmental surveillance, however, may in other cases enhance social 
welfare by encouraging productive transactions, diminishing the costs of non-legal privacy 
barriers, and limiting suboptimal policing practices, including discriminatory profiling and the 
enforcement of inefficient criminal prohibitions. Economics and public choice theory can also 
help to minimize decision-making error by predicting which legal actors – police, legislatures, or 
courts – are best placed to make optimal trade-offs between privacy and crime control.  
 The article proceeds as follows. In Part II, I briefly describe the United States and 
Canadian supreme courts’ reasonable expectation of privacy jurisprudence and canvass its chief 
inadequacy: the indeterminacy of the “public exposure” and “intimacy” doctrines that the courts 
have used to decide whether to regulate novel search technologies. Part III outlines the economic 
approach to the reasonable expectation of privacy test. Parts IV and V apply this approach to two 
novel search technologies: infrared imaging and location tracking. This analysis suggests that 
courts should recognize a reasonable expectation of privacy in the latter case, but not the former. 
Part VI concludes. 
 
(2003). 
II REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY DOCTRINE AND NOVEL SEARCH TECHNOLOGIES 
The use of the reasonable expectation of privacy test dates from the United States 
Supreme Court’s 1967 decision in Katz v. United States.16 Katz famously departed from the 
prevailing conception of Fourth Amendment searches as physical trespasses into 
“constitutionally-protected” areas.17 In deciding that the placement of an electronic listening and 
recording device outside a public telephone booth was a search, Justice Stewart declared in his 
majority reasons that the Amendment protected “people, not places”18 and the surreptitious 
interception of the petitioner’s conversation “violated the privacy upon which he justifiably 
relied.”19 The “reasonable expectation” phraseology, however, stems from Justice Harlan’s 
concurring reasons. He stated, in language later adopted by a majority of the Court, that to be 
considered a search, it must be shown both that a person “exhibited an actual (subjective) 
expectation of privacy” and that the expectation be “one that society is prepared to recognize as 
‘reasonable.’”20 In its first decision interpreting section 8 of the Charter, the Supreme Court of 
Canada adopted the same approach.21 
How then have courts gone about deciding what constitutes a “reasonable expectation of 
 
16 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
17 See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).   
18 Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. See also id. at 353 (“Once it is recognized that the Fourth Amendment protects 
people – and not simply ‘areas’ – against unreasonable searches and seizures, it becomes clear that the reach of that 
Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure.”). 
19 Id. at 353. 
20 Id. at 361, Harlan J., concurring. See also United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7 (1977); United States 
v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14 (1973); Couch v. United States, 409 
U.S. 322, 335-36 (1973); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968); United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984); 
Oliver, 466 U.S. at 177. 
21 Hunter, [1984] 2 S.C.R at 159 (“The guarantee of security from unreasonable search and seizure only 
protects a reasonable expectation.”). 
privacy”? This is not the place to summarize the reams of doctrine on the question.22 It will be 
helpful, however, to provide some sense of how the United States and Canadian supreme courts 
have applied the test to novel search technologies.  
 Not surprisingly (and contrary to Justice Harlan’s dictum in Katz), courts have not 
considered the existence of a subjective expectation of privacy to be a necessary condition of 
constitutional protection;23 otherwise police could simply advertise their intention to monitor 
everything capable of being monitored.24 People who were more suspicious or aware of 
governmental surveillance, moreover, would receive less constitutional protection than those 
more trusting or ignorant.25 The focus has instead been on the second component of Harlan’s 
formula: whether an expectation of privacy is “reasonable.”  
 Like other reasonableness standards, the reasonable expectation of privacy test is facially 
extremely vague. Insofar as it gauges “expectations” of privacy (both subjective and objective) in 
relation to prevailing social and technological conditions, it is also tautological. As Wasserstrom 
and Seidman have put it, “[r]easonable expectations are defined by reference to a current reality 
that includes the very practices under attack, rather than by reference to the kinds of expectations 
people would have in a normatively attractive society.”26 The test’s language implies that we can 
 
22 See generally SCOTT C. HUTCHISON & JAMES C. MORTON, SEARCH AND SEIZURE LAW IN CANADA,
(1990); LAFAVE, supra note 4. 
23 See R. v. Tessling, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 432 ¶ 42 (Can.). 
24 See Anthony Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 384 (1974); 
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 n.5 (1979); Melvin Gutterman, A Formulation of the Value and Means 
Models of the Fourth Amendment in the Age of Technologically Enhanced Surveillance, 39 SYRACUSE L. REV. 647, 
675-76 (1988). 
25 Surveillance-related paranoia could thus to some extent be a self-fulfilling prophesy. See Tessling, 3
S.C.R. ¶ 42 (“It is one thing to say that a person who puts out the garbage has no reasonable expectation of privacy 
in it. It is quite another to say that someone who fears their telephone is bugged no longer has a subjective 
expectation of privacy and thereby forfeits the protection of s. 8.”); Gutterman, supra note 24, at 675 (“A citizen's 
unfounded belief that his private activities were not protected had a ‘self-determining’ quality: the fourth 
amendment's protections as he perceived them were the maximum benefit that he could obtain.”). 
26 Wasserstrom & Seidman, supra note 10, at 63-4. 
expect less and less constitutional protection for privacy as technology continues to enhance the 
power and lower the costs of surveillance.27 
To be sure, courts have attempted to suffuse the test with normative content.28 They have 
pointed out many of privacy’s virtues and catalogued myriad factors influencing reasonable 
expectation of privacy decisions. But the key conceptual tools that the courts have developed to 
aid these decisions – the public exposure and intimacy doctrines – have produced little 
jurisprudential consistency, predictability, or consensus. 
 Public exposure – The public exposure doctrine exempts from constitutional protection 
information voluntarily disclosed to the public. As Justice Stewart put it in Katz, “what a person 
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth 
Amendment protection . . . [b]ut what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible 
to the public, may be constitutionally protected.”29 The doctrine is a natural outgrowth of liberal 
moral theory. If rational, autonomous agents freely choose to expose information to the public, 
then they cannot complain if others use that information against them.  
 It seems axiomatic that information voluntarily released into the public domain cannot 
attract a reasonable expectation of privacy. The problem, of course, is that the meanings of 
“voluntary” and “public” are sometimes contestable. People frequently divulge information, for 
 
27 See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27,47, Stevens J., dissenting (2001) (considering whether a sense-
enhancing technology is in general public use “is somewhat perverse because it seems likely that the threat to 
privacy will grow, rather than recede, as the use of intrusive equipment becomes more readily available.”); Cloud, 
supra note 12, at 262 (“If a majority of Justices ever were to conclude that satellite technology was generally 
available to the public, then its use for government surveillance would not constitute a search regulated by the 
amendment.”); Gutterman supra note 24, at 720 (“The fourth amendment may now be defined solely by the degree 
of sophistication used in the surveillance and the speed by which technological advances become generally 
disseminated and available to the public.”).  
28 See e.g. Tessling, [2004] 3 S.C.R ¶ 42 (“Expectation of privacy is a normative rather than a descriptive 
standard.”). 
29 Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. 
example, assuming that it will be used only for certain limited purposes.30 They may also subject 
themselves to observation assuming that their identities will likely remain anonymous. But what 
happens when technological search tools upend these assumptions? Can we still say that there 
has been a voluntary exposure? 
 Judges have given divergent answers to these questions. For example, the United States 
and Canadian Supreme Courts have differed on the question of whether the electronic 
interception of speech constitutes a “search” when one of the speakers is an undercover police 
informant. As discussed, the United States Supreme Court established in Katz that surreptitious 
interceptions of private communications are Fourth Amendment searches. Soon after, however, it 
decided that when one of the communicators is aware of the interception, Katz does not apply.31 
In White, the Court held that if the law “gives no protection to the wrongdoer whose trusted 
accomplice is or becomes a police agent, neither should it protect him when that same agent has 
recorded or transmitted the conversations which are later offered in evidence to prove the State’s 
case.”32 
The Supreme Court of Canada has taken a different approach. Following Katz, it has 
unsurprisingly ruled that the surreptitious electronic interception of private communications 
invades a reasonable expectation of privacy.33 But in Duarte, it rejected the “risk analysis” of 
 
30 See A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1465 (2000); R v. Dyment, 
[1988] 2 S.C.R. 417, 429-30 (Can.); R. v. Buhay, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 631 ¶ 22 (Can.). 
31 United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971) (plurality) (no expectation of privacy when defendant 
communicates with informant surreptitiously carrying a “wire” transmitting conversations to police). White therefore 
confirmed the vitality of the Court’s pre-Katz jurisprudence on participant intercepts. See On Lee v. United States, 
343 U.S. 747 (1954) (no Fourth Amendment search where suspect’s conversations with undercover agent 
transmitted to other agents via concealed radio transmitter) and Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963) (no 
Fourth Amendment search where government agent records conversation with suspect with concealed electronic 
device). 
32 Lopez, 373 U.S. at 752. 
33 See Duarte, [1990] 1 S.C.R at 42 (“surreptitious electronic surveillance of the individual by an agency of 
White and held that participant surveillance also constitutes a section 8 search.34 Writing for the 
Court, Justice La Forest asserted that while section 8 does not protect people from the risk that 
their confidants will turn out to be informers, it does prohibit the state from arbitrarily making a 
“permanent electronic record” of their conversations.35 The Court similarly held in R. v. Wong 
that surreptitious video surveillance (without audio interception) invades a reasonable 
expectation of privacy.36 
Similar differences have arisen over whether it invades a reasonable expectation of 
privacy to follow a suspect’s vehicle over public roads using a surreptitiously-planted, radio-
frequency tracking device. In United States v. Knotts, the United States Supreme Court held that 
it did not.37 This type of surveillance, the Court reasoned, revealed no more information than 
could have been obtained through visual surveillance of the vehicle from public vantage points. 
“Nothing in the Fourth Amendment,” Justice Rehnquist wrote, prohibited the police from 
augmenting the sensory faculties bestowed upon them at birth with such enhancement as science 
and technology afforded them . . ..”38 In United States v. Karo, however, the Court decided that 
the Fourth Amendment is engaged when beepers are used to track items within private 
 
the state constitutes an unreasonable search or seizure under s. 8 of the Charter”); R. v. Wiggins [1990] 1 S.C.R. 62 
(Can.); R. v. Thompson [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1111, 1136-37 (Can.). 
34 [1990] 1 S.C.R. In so doing, the Court struck down what was then s. 178.11 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 
1985, c. C-46, which exempted participant surveillance from the prohibition against warrantless electronic 
surveillance. 
35 Duarte, [1990] 1 S.C.R at 48. Note however that s. 8 of the Charter is not violated when someone privy 
to an illegally recorded communication (such as an undercover agent wearing a “wire”) testifies at trial as to their 
recollection of the communication, even if the participant’s memory has been refreshed by reference to the tainted 
recording. But section 8 is violated when portions of an illegally obtained recording or transcript that a witness does 
not recall are adduced in evidence. See R. v. Fliss [2002] 1 S.C.R. 535 (Can.). 
36 Wong, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 36 (police placed hidden video camera in wall of suspects’ hotel room). 
37 460 U.S. 276 at 281-82 (1983) (police attached beeper to a chemical container that suspect subsequently 
placed in his vehicle). 
38 Id. at 283. 
residences.39 Unlike in Knotts, the Court noted, the beeper in Karo was used “to obtain 
information that it could not have obtained by observation from outside the curtilage of the 
house.”40 
Though it seemed reluctant to do so, the Supreme Court of Canada concluded in R. v. 
Wise that the use of a beeper to monitor a vehicle on public roads invaded a reasonable 
expectation of privacy.41 The Court declared, however, that the invasion of privacy was 
minimal.42 “This particular beeper,” the majority stated, “was a very rudimentary extension of 
physical surveillance.”43 
There has also been disagreement on whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists 
in relation to the non-content “envelope” information accompanying electronic 
communications.44 In Smith v. Maryland, the United States Supreme Court ruled that the 
installation and use of a “pen register,” which records the numbers dialled from a telephone, did 
not invade a reasonable expectation of privacy.45 The Court noted that the register did not record 
the content of conversations and suggested that people are aware that the numbers they dial may 
 
39 468 U.S. 705 (1984).  
40 Id. at 715. 
41 [1992] 1 S.C.R. 527 at 538. 
42 Id. at 534-36. 
43 Id. at 535. Notably, the Crown had conceded that the installation of the beeper violated section 8. Id. at 
532 and 538. Not surprisingly, the Court concluded that despite the violation, the trial judge should not have 
excluded evidence obtained from the beeper. Id. at 539-48. The Court also recommended the passage of legislation 
authorizing tracking warrants and hinted that a “lower standard” of suspicion would be sufficient to justify them. Id. 
at 548-49. As discussed infra note 142, Parliament subsequently enacted a provision authorizing the issuance of 
tracking warrants on the basis of reasonable suspicion. 
44 “Envelope” information refers to addressing and other information attached to a communication that is 
the functional equivalent of the information contained on the outside of a letter mail envelope. See Orin Kerr, 
Internet Surveillance After the USA Patriot Act: The Big Brother That Isn’t, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 607, 611-16 (2003). 
45 442 U.S. 735 (1979) [Smith]. It is implicit in the Court’s decision that “trap and trace” devices, which 
record the numbers associated with incoming telephone calls, do not invade a reasonable expectation of privacy. See 
Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Hamm, 409 S.E.2d 775, 780 (S.C., 1991) (“In light of the holding in Smith, we 
cannot hold that the telephone number of the equipment from which a call has been placed is entitled to more 
privacy than the telephone numbers called by someone.”). 
be recorded for commercial and law enforcement purposes.46 In any event, it concluded, any 
expectation of privacy was not reasonable, as a person has “no legitimate expectation of privacy 
in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.”47 In Canada, in contrast, several lower 
courts have found that people have a reasonable expectation of privacy in relation to telephone 
envelope information and warrants to seize it must be based on reasonable and probable 
grounds.48 
Intimacy – As its name suggests, the intimacy doctrine holds that searches revealing 
sensitive personal information are more likely to trigger a reasonable expectation of privacy than 
those uncovering only mundane information. Like the public exposure doctrine, the intimacy 
doctrine is intuitively appealing.49 People are less concerned about disclosing routine details of 
their daily lives than potentially stigmatizing information, such as views or activities relating to 
sexuality, politics, or religion. And like the public exposure doctrine, the intimacy doctrine 
derives from liberal moral philosophy. For liberal privacy theorists, intimate information is more 
central to autonomy, identity, and personality than non-intimate information.50 
But as legal economists have pointed out, intimate information is not self-evidently 
 
46 Smith, 442 U.S. at 742. 
47 Id. at 743-44. The Supreme Court of Canada has not considered communications envelope data. Before 
1993, most lower courts had followed the United States Supreme Court in holding that the seizure of such data did 
not invade a reasonable expectation of privacy. In 1993, Parliament enacted a warrant provision authorizing such 
seizures on the basis of reasonable suspicion. See infra note 144 and accompanying text. 
48 See R. v. Nguyen, 2004 BCSC 76 (use of reasonable suspicion warrant to obtain record of outgoing and 
incoming telephone numbers from defendant’s mobile phone violated s. 8); R. v. Hackert, [1997] O.J. No. 6384 
(Gen. Div.) (QL) (Criminal Code provision authorizing reasonable suspicion warrants for telephone envelope 
information violates s. 8). 
49 See generally R. v. Mills, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668, 722 (Can.) (“privacy concerns are at their strongest where 
aspects of one’s individual identity are at stake, such as in the context of information ‘about one’s lifestyle, intimate 
relations or political or religious opinions’.”). 
50 See e.g. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890); 
Bloustein, supra note 6; Jonathan Kahn, Privacy as a Legal Principle of Identity Maintenance, 33 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 371(2003); Jeffrey Reiman, Privacy, Intimacy, and Personhood, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 26 (1977); Gavison, 
supra note 6, at 444-45. 
deserving of legal protection.51 Under competitive conditions, there is no reason to protect one 
party’s ability to conceal private information. In voluntary transactions (whether economic or 
social), the parties’ preferences for knowledge and privacy should generate the disclosure of the 
efficient amount of information.52 Granting legal protection for the concealment of discreditable 
(but truthful) information is inefficient, because it increases the cost of productive transactions. If 
it is inefficient to protect sellers’ ability to misrepresent the quality of their goods, then it is 
equally inefficient to protect people’s ability to misrepresent their character to others.53 By 
limiting our ability to discern others’ characters, trustworthiness, and other attributes, privacy 
either increases the cost of or deters productive economic and social interactions. 
 It is inappropriate, some might argue, to analogize the state’s attempt to obtain personal 
information to the sale of goods between private parties. But the case for protecting intimate, 
private information from governmental scrutiny rests on the same ground as in private 
transactions. While capacity of government to cause harm by collecting personal information is 
great, so is people’s capacity to cause harm by concealing it. More crime is the inevitable 
consequence of inhibiting government’s ability to uncover discreditable, private information.
 However, as discussed in detail below, allowing police to obtain personal information by 
certain means may sometimes generate suboptimal outcomes, for example when unrestricted 
wiretapping would inhibit communication or induce wasteful spending on measures to protect 
privacy. In such cases it may be efficient to regulate investigative methods that invade privacy. 
This suggests that in determining the constitutionality of a novel search technique, courts should 
focus on the methods used by police and not the nature of the information those methods reveal. 
 
51 See Stigler, supra note 14 at 627. 
52 Id.; Posner, supra note 9, at 399-400. 
In most cases, this is precisely what the law does. When police can demonstrate sufficient 
grounds for suspicion, they are permitted to collect highly intimate information.  
 Of course, courts use the reasonable expectation of privacy test to determine whether 
police can search in the absence of such a demonstration. In such cases, it could be argued that 
gauging the intimacy of the information revealed by a search technique helps predict whether 
regulating the technique would prevent inefficient behavioural responses. 
 In practice, however, measuring the inherent intimacy of information has proven to be 
exceedingly difficult. Courts have come to varying conclusions, for example, on the question of 
whether a reasonable expectation of privacy is invaded when information normally contained in 
constitutionally protected areas (such as residences, vehicles, or luggage) is extracted by “sense-
enhancing” technologies. Before and after Katz, the United States Supreme Court ruled that the 
use of flashlights and telescopic lenses does not constitute a Fourth Amendment search.54 It has 
come to the same conclusion with respect to the visual observation of property from the air (with 
either the untrained eye or cameras), so long as the airspace is “publically navigable” and the 
search is not “physically intrusive.”55 Activities that are “clearly visible” from a “public vantage 
point,” the Ciraolo Court reasoned, are not protected by the Fourth Amendment.56 It warned, 
 
53 See Posner, id.
54 See United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927) (“use of a searchlight is comparable to the use of a 
marine glass or a field glass. It is not prohibited by the Constitution.”); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 739-40 
(1983) (police use of flashlight to illuminate portion of automobile interior open to plain sight not a search); United 
States v. Dunn, 107 S. Ct. 1134, 1141 (1987) (police use of a flashlight from an “open field” vantage point to 
illuminate barn’s interior). 
55 California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986) (unaided visual surveillance from 1000 feet of a 
backyard enclosed by high double fences). See also Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986) (use of 
high-resolution mapping camera at 12,000, 3,000, and 1,200 feet to photograph industrial facilities shielded from 
ground-level observation); Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989) (unaided visual surveillance of partially-covered 
greenhouse from 400 feet). As the Kyllo majority noted, 533 U.S. at 33, the only one of these cases in which police 
used a technological aid to the naked eye (Dow), involved surveillance of commercial buildings – not a private 
residence. 
56 476 U.S. at 213. 
however, that it might decide differently where observations are made with “modern technology 
which discloses to the senses those intimate associations, objects or activities otherwise 
imperceptible to police or fellow citizens”57 or “highly sophisticated surveillance equipment not 
generally available to the public, such as satellite technology.”58 
The Court heeded this warning in Kyllo v. United States, where a narrow majority ruled 
that police violated the Fourth Amendment by using an infrared camera to detect heat radiating 
from an residential marijuana growing operation, despite the fact that the device was not 
physically penetrating and showed only crude images of relatively warmer and cooler areas.59 
“[O]btaining by sense-enhancing technology any information regarding the interior of the home 
that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical ‘intrusion into a constitutionally 
protected area’,” Justice Scalia wrote, “constitutes a search – at least where (as here) the 
technology in question is not in general public use.”60 The Court came to a different conclusion 
in two cases where police used drug sniffing dogs to detect narcotics concealed in airport 
luggage61 and the trunk of a vehicle.62 Such searches are relatively non-intrusive, the Court 
concluded, and reveal no information other than the presence of contraband.63 
The Supreme Court of Canada has not yet dealt with either visual aerial surveillance or 
drug sniffing dogs. Lower courts, however, have typically rejected the American approach and 
found a reasonable expectation of privacy.64 But in R. v. Tessling,65 the Supreme Court 
 
57 Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 215 n.3, quoting Brief for Petitioner at 14-15. 
58 Dow, 476 U.S. at 238. 
59 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 30. I discuss Kyllo in detail infra notes 150-64 and accompanying text. 
60 Id. at 34 [citations omitted]. 
61 United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983). 
62 Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409-10 (2005).  
63 Id.
64 See R. v. Kelly, 169 D.L.R. (4th) 720 ¶¶ 43-53 (N.B.C.A. 1999) (unaided aerial surveillance of 
residential garden from any altitude invades a reasonable expectation of privacy); R. v. Cook, 1999 ABQB 35 ¶¶ 55-
unanimously held (on the same facts as Kyllo) that warrantless infrared camera searches did not 
violate section 8 of the Charter. “Heat distribution,” Justice Binnie stated, “offers no insight into 
[the suspect’s] private life, and reveals nothing of his ‘biographical core of personal 
information’.”66 
The limitations of the intimacy doctrine have also been exposed in a line of cases dealing 
with searches of third party information databases. In United States v. Miller, the United States 
Supreme Court held that prosecutors invaded no reasonable expectation of privacy when they 
subpoenaed a suspect’s banking records.67 The records contained only “information voluntarily 
conveyed to the banks and exposed to their employees in the ordinary course of business.”68 
“The depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another,” the Court reasoned, “that the 
information will be conveyed by that person to the Government . . . even if the information is 
revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence 
placed in the third party will not be betrayed.”69 
The Supreme Court of Canada has not dealt definitively with banking records, though 
some of its members have suggested that they do attract a reasonable expectation of privacy.70 
62 (unaided visual surveillance of residential lot from 50-100 (but not 1,000) feet invades a reasonable expectation 
of privacy); R. v. Lam; R. v. Dinh, 178 C.C.C. (3d) 59 ¶¶ 27-39 (Alta. C.A 2003) (sniff of luggage and luggage 
locker at bus terminal by trained dog invades a reasonable expectation of privacy). 
65 Tessling, [2004] 3 S.C.R. I discuss Tessling in detail infra notes 150-64 and accompanying text. 
66 Id. ¶ 63, citing R. v. Plant, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 281, 293 (Can.). 
67 Miller 425 U.S. 435. 
68 Id. at 442. 
69 Id. at 443. 
70 In Schreiber v. Canada (Attorney General), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 841 (Can.), the Supreme Court of Canada 
considered whether the seizure of a suspect’s foreign banking records violated s. 8 of the Charter. The majority 
concluded that the Canadian government’s request for foreign assistance did not engage s. 8; it declined to consider 
whether a warrantless search of a suspect’s domestic banking records would have attracted a reasonable expectation 
of privacy. In his concurring reasons, Lamer C.J. indicated that he would have answered “yes” to this question. Id. ¶
22. In his dissent, Iacobucci J. concluded that the suspect did have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his foreign 
banking records. Id. ¶ 55. 
Lower courts have come to varying conclusions.71 The Supreme Court has ruled, however, in a 
case where police obtained a suspect’s electrical consumption records from the local utility.72 
This did not constitute a section 8 search, Justice Sopinka concluded, because such records do 
not invade that “biographical core of personal information which individuals in a free and 
democratic society would wish to maintain and control from dissemination to the state.”73 The 
records, he reasoned, “cannot reasonably be said to reveal intimate details of the appellant’s life 
since electricity consumption reveals very little about the personal lifestyle or private decisions 
of the occupant of the residence.”74 
III THE ECONOMIC APPROACH 
Can economics point the way to a more determinate and normatively satisfying approach 
to the reasonable expectation of privacy test? As mentioned, economists typically view privacy 
as an aspect of rational self-interest.75 They posit that privacy permits people to conceal 
(discreditable) personal information that might be used to their disadvantage.76 It is in people’s 
interest to maximize this ability, selectively disclosing (and thereafter controlling) their personal 
 
71 See R. v. Lillico, 92 C.C.C. (3d) 90 (Ont. Gen. Div. 1994) (police request for information with respect to 
a single cheque and subsequent account activity did not invade reasonable expectation of privacy); R. v. Eddy, 119 
Nfld. & PEIR 91 ¶ 183 (Nfld. S.C.T.D. 1994) (police inquiry as to owner of bank account and whether any 
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72 Plant, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 281. 
73 Id. at 293. 
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75 See Allesandro Acquisti & Jens Grossklags, Privacy and Rationality in Individual Decision Making, 3(1) 
IEEE SECURITY & PRIVACY 26, 26 (2005). 
76 See Posner, supra note 9, at 399; Richard Epstein, Deconstructing Privacy: And Putting it Back Together 
Again, 17 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 1, 12-4 (2000); Charles M. Kahn, et al., A Theory of Transactions Privacy 2 (Federal 
Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Working Paper 2000-22, 2000) at http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/papers/01/0112.pdf. See 
also Anita L. Allen, Privacy-as-Data Control: Conceptual, Practical, and Moral Limits of the Paradigm, 32 CONN.
L. REV. 861, 872 (2000). Empirical evidence has indicated that group members’ concern for privacy increases in 
relation to the degree to which they perceive that their characteristics (such as age and weight) deviate from the 
group’s norm. See Bernardo Hubermana et al., Valuating Privacy, Technical Report, HP Labs, 2004, at 
information to achieve desired ends.77 It is not always in society’s interests, however.78 If 
privacy in a particular realm is used chiefly to conceal socially harmful conduct (such as crime), 
then legal protection for privacy in that realm should be weak and police should be given broad 
search powers. If, on the other hand, privacy encourages efficient behaviours, then legal 
protections should be strong and police powers limited. Courts applying the reasonable 
expectation of privacy test to an investigative technique should thus identify and weigh the costs 
and benefits of limiting the state’s ability to obtain information about criminal suspects. 
 Privacy costs – The costs of privacy are the easiest to discern. By thwarting the detection 
and punishment of criminals, legal privacy protections generate two types of social costs. First, 
most crimes are inefficient,79 so privacy laws detract from social welfare by diminishing the 
deterrence of crime. For example, if police cannot use electronic surveillance to acquire evidence 
to support an application to obtain a warrant to physically search a suspected drug dealer’s home, 
and there is no other equally effective investigative technique available, fewer physical searches 
will occur, diminishing the probability of punishment and thus the expected cost of dealing 
drugs. Drug dealing will thus become a more attractive endeavour. Second, by restricting the use 
of particular search techniques, privacy laws may force authorities to use more costly 
substitutes.80 For example, if police replace electronic surveillance with undercover informants, 
law enforcement costs may rise, as undercover operations are very likely more expensive and 
dangerous than electronic surveillance.  
 
http://www.hpl.hp.com/research/idl/papers/deviance/deviance.pdf. 
77 See James B. Rule, Strong Privacy: Values, Markets, Mechanisms, and Institutions, 54 U. TORONTO L.J. 
183, 188 (2004). 
78 See generally Jerry Kang & Benedikt Buchner, Privacy in Atlantis, 18 HARV. J. L & TECH. 1, 23 (2004). 
79 See generally ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 443 (3d ed. 2000). 
80 See Stigler, supra note 14, at 628-29.  
Privacy benefits – Though privacy’s social benefits are somewhat more obscure, they are 
by no means insignificant. While privacy makes it easier for people to engage in antisocial 
conduct (including crime), it may also provide an incentive for productive activity.81 Privacy 
may thus reduce “avoidance costs”; that is, the opportunity cost entailed when people forgo 
socially beneficial transactions fearing the disclosure of information that could be used against 
them. There are two types of avoidance costs that privacy laws can mitigate. First, privacy 
enhances the quantity and quality of interpersonal communications. For example, legal 
restrictions on eavesdropping (by police or nosy neighbours) free people to communicate more 
candidly.82 Privacy diminishes the risk that information that we rationally disclose to intended 
recipients will be obtained (and used to our detriment) by unintended recipients.83 Conversely, 
widespread eavesdropping causes people to be more formal and guarded in their communications 
– not only in relation to criminal conversations but also those revealing discreditable (but non-
criminal) information.84 As Richard Posner puts it, the “principal effect of allowing 
 
81 See Song, supra note 15, at 3. 
82 See Posner, supra note 9, at 401-03; Richard Posner, PRIVACY, SECRECY, AND REPUTATION, 28 BUFF. L. 
REV. 1, 17 (1979); Charles J. Hartmann & Stephen M. Renas, Anglo-American Privacy Law: An Economic Analysis,
5 INT’L REV. LAW ECON. 133, 145 (1985); Epstein, supra note 76, at 9. For a similar argument articulated in non-
economic terms, see Amsterdam, supra note 24, at 388. 
83 The benefits of privacy in promoting productive activity are magnified when the activity produces 
external benefits. Communication is especially likely to generate positive externalities. Information revealed under 
the cloak of privacy in pursuit self-interest may also be highly valuable to the intended recipients of that 
information. But if the absence of privacy means that the marginal private cost of revealing the information is 
greater than the private benefit, the information will not be disclosed and the external benefits will not materialize. 
See generally Song, supra note 15, at 11-12; Peter Huang, The Law and Economics of Consumer Privacy Versus 
Data Mining, (May 1998), at http://ssrn.com/abstract=94041. 
 Another benefit of privacy (more relevant in the case of private transactions than governmental 
surveillance) is that it can increase the amount of socially productive information. In the absence of privacy, there 
would be little incentive for people to invest in obtaining valuable information, since this information would be 
easily obtainable. This is the economic justification for the law of confidentiality, which provides contractual and 
tort remedies for disclosures of information imparted in confidence. See e.g. Ejan Mackaay, Economic Incentives in 
Markets for Information and Innovation, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 867 (1990). I am indebted to Norman 
Siebrasse for this insight. 
84 See Duarte, [1990] 1 S.C.R. at 50, 52, and 54 (“Few of us would ever speak freely if we knew that all 
our words were being captured by machines for later release before an unknown and potentially hostile audience. No 
eavesdropping would not be to make the rest of society more informed about the individual but 
to make conversations more cumbersome and less effective.”85 This helps to explain why legal 
protections against invasions of communicative privacy are so robust.86 
Second, privacy (in the form of anonymity) may encourage people to participate in 
beneficial activities that they would not engage in otherwise.87 This is a social benefit that must 
be measured against privacy’s impact in promoting crime. If teenagers were required to provide 
proof of identity before purchasing condoms, for example, sexually transmitted diseases 
unwanted pregnancies would become more prevalent. Similarly, the placement of video 
surveillance cameras in a high-crime neighbourhood could dissuade people from using nearby 
needle exchanges or AIDS clinics. 
 Privacy laws may also reduce the costs associated with protecting privacy by non-legal 
means (“defensive costs”).88 Instead of avoiding communications or activities that could reveal 
personal information, people may wastefully expend resources to protect their privacy.89 Without 
wiretapping laws, for example, people would be more likely to use public payphones instead of 
their own phones.  
 In the absence of legal privacy protections, the likelihood that people will employ non-
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85 Posner, supra note 9, at 403. See also Posner, supra note 82, at 17; Richard A. Posner, The Economics of 
Privacy, 71 AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS 405, 406 (1981). 
86 See Duarte, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 30; Wiggins [1990] 1 S.C.R. 62; Thompson [1990] 2 S.C.R. 111; Wong 
[1990] 3 S.C.R. 36. See also Criminal Code, § 184(1) (criminalizing the willful interception of private electronic 
communications). 
87 This goal might also be furthered by restricting law enforcement’s ability to disclose information that it 
has collected for reasons unrelated to the furtherance of criminal investigations and prosecutions. See William J. 
Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 YALE L.J. 2137, 2183-85 (2002). 
88 Friedman, supra note 14, at 192-93; Song, supra note 15, at 15-16. 
89 See Amsterdam, supra note 24, at 403 (“The question is not whether you or I must draw the blinds before 
we commit a crime. It is whether you and I must discipline ourselves to draw the blinds every time we enter a room, 
legal substitutes depends on both the price of those substitutes and the elasticity of the demand 
for privacy. This insight may determine when it is cost-justified to regulate governmental 
surveillance. Suppose that there were no law limiting police’s ability to intercept or search email 
communications. People using email for non-criminal purposes could rationally conclude that the 
marginal private benefit of encrypting email is lower than its cost.90 Such persons would suffer 
the costs incurred by either exposing sensitive information or avoiding doing so with email. The 
marginal private benefit of using encryption for criminal purposes, in contrast, will in most cases 
be higher than for non-criminal purposes. Criminals are consequently more likely to use 
encryption to thwart governmental surveillance than non-criminals. In these circumstances, 
regulating the state’s ability to obtain email communications is likely to reduce non-criminals’ 
avoidance costs without substantially diminishing the deterrence of crime.  
 So far I have been discussing the value of privacy in fostering socially productive non-
criminal discourse and activity. I have assumed that there is no value in protecting people against 
governmental intrusions revealing criminal behaviour. This assumption can be questioned. 
Where there is a strong consensus that the harms caused by a type of crime are severe, we should 
be willing to tolerate the use of fairly intrusive investigative methods to deter it,91 provided that 
productive non-criminal behaviour is not unduly chilled. Privacy invasions are less acceptable, 
however, when this consensus is not as strong, as is arguably the case for many “consensual” 
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90 These include material costs, such as adoption and usage costs, as well as immaterial costs, such as 
learning and switching costs as well as any social stigma associated with using privacy-protecting technologies. See 
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91 See Posner, supra note 82, at 52-53; Friedman, supra note 14, at 200. 
crimes like drug trafficking, prostitution, and gambling.92 Put in economic terms, enforcing these 
prohibitions (or enforcing them through privacy-invasive techniques) may be inefficient, as 
enforcement costs may outweigh the harms generated by the prohibited activities.93 In some 
cases, therefore, legal privacy protections may help to limit the enforcement of bad laws. 
 Privacy laws may also help to prevent governments from discriminating against 
disfavoured minorities.94 Broad, discretionary investigative powers are more likely to be used 
against those disadvantaged by poverty, race, or ethnicity than powers constrained by the 
requirements of prior authorization and probable cause.95 These requirements increase the 
likelihood that searches will be based on concrete, individualized suspicion – not discriminatory 
stereotypes.    
 But what exactly is discriminatory stereotyping? Economists distinguish between 
“biased” profiling (based on animus towards members of a minority group) and “statistical” 
profiling (arising from the disproportionate targeting of group members based on an accurate 
assessment of that group’s offending rate).96 If group members are more likely to commit a 
particular offence than people in the general population, then many economists would say that it 
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EUR. J. POL. ECON. 597 (2002); Vani K. Borooah, Economic Analysis of Police Stops and Searches: A Reply, 18 
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is legitimate to consider group membership in deciding who to investigate.97 If, on the other 
hand, offence rates for a particular crime are equal as between groups, then it is likely that any 
inter-group disparity in arrest rates reflects bias against the group with the higher arrest rate.98 
Which of these scenarios is closer to reality? Numerous studies have shown that in many 
places in the United States, police are more likely to stop and search African American and 
Hispanic drivers than white drivers.99 But explanations for this disparity vary. Some researchers 
argue that for offences typically associated with “racial profiling,”100 minority and majority 
offending rates are generally similar; they conclude therefore that any disproportionate targeting 
of minorities indicates bias.101 However, many of the studies showing disproportionate stop rates 
have also found that majority and minority “hit” rates (i.e. the ratio of successful to unsuccessful 
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 Canadian police forces do not typically keep statistics on basis of race or ethnicity, and there has thus been 
little in the way of rigorous empirical analysis of profiling in Canada. There is evidence, however, that at least some 
Canadian police forces disproportionately target certain racial groups (especially African Canadians). See COMM’N
ON SYSTEMIC RACISM IN THE ONTARIO CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYS., REPORT 358 (1995). 
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searches) are very similar; this is consistent, some have argued, with legitimate statistical 
discrimination based on higher minority offending rates.102 
Despite the ambiguity of the American data, and the dearth of Canadian evidence, there 
are good reasons to think that biased profiling is widespread in both countries, and that it likely 
generates significant social costs that in most cases outweigh any concomitant benefits. There is 
strong evidence, for example, that police in several U.S. states search Hispanic motorists much 
more frequently than could be explained by statistical discrimination.103 And rigorously designed 
psychological experimentation has shown that racial, ethnic, and gender stereotyping is 
pervasive and insidious.104 This research supports the growing recognition among jurists, 
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 Dominitz demonstrates that the hit rate theory is correct, then it would be impossible to simultaneously 
equalize rates (as between racial groups) of apprehending the guilty and detaining the innocent. Policymakers, in 
other words, would have to choose between ending the disproportionate searching of innocent minority drivers and 
ensuring that guilty minority drivers are as likely to be caught as whites. See Dominitz, supra at 423-24.  
103 See Knowles et al. supra note 102, at 219-22; Hernàndez-Murillo & Knowles, supra note 102; see 
Donohue, supra note 97, at 22-7. 
104 The psychological dynamics of racial and other forms of stereotyping, which are often deployed 
subconsciously and reflexively, are described in Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1499-
1520 (2004). Kang summarizes recent social cognition research as follows: 
There is now persuasive evidence that implicit bias against a social category . . . predicts disparate 
behavior toward individuals mapped to that category. This occurs notwithstanding contrary 
especially in Canada, that racial bias (including biased investigative profiling) is an endemic 
feature of the criminal justice system.105 
Moreover, even unbiased, statistical profiling may generate undesirable distributive 
outcomes.106 And even if we restrict our assessment of profiling’s social costs to conventional 
economic concerns, it is not clear that statistical profiling is efficient. As Bernard Harcourt has 
argued, law enforcement efficiency is not achieved by equalizing hit rates; but rather by 
minimizing both crime and enforcement costs.107 Profiling is efficient, therefore, only when it: (i)
reduces the amount of profiled crime;108 (ii) does not diminish the efficient allocation of police 
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Anthony N. Doob, Race, Ethnicity and Criminal Justice in Canada, in ETHNICITY, CRIME AND IMMIGRATION:
COMPARATIVE AND CROSS-NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 469, 519 (Michael Tonry, ed., 1997); R. v. Parks, 84 C.C.C. 
(3d) 353 (Ont. C.A. 1993); R. v. S.(R.D.), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 484 ¶ 38 (Can.), L’Heureux-Dubé and McLachlin JJ.; R. 
v. Williams, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 1128 (Can.); R. v. Brown, 64 O.R. (3d) 161 ¶ 9 (C.A., 2003); R. v. C.R.H. 174 C.C.C. 
(3d) 67 ¶ 49 (Man. C.A., 2003). 
106 See generally Donohue, supra note 97, at 23-5 (discussing how statistical discrimination can lead to the 
reenforcement of stereotypes that worsen the disadvantage of historically subordinated groups); CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 157-58 (1997) (noting that discrimination, in whatever form, can reduce 
minorities’ incentive to invest in human capital). 
107 See Bernard Harcourt, Rethinking Racial Profiling: A Critique of the Economics, Civil Liberties, and 
Constitutional Literature, and of Criminal Profiling More Generally, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1275 at 1281-82, 1307-15 
(2004). 
108 This condition may not be satisfied, for example, if the profiling of minority drivers gives white drivers 
a sense of impunity and thus increases their criminal activity. More generally, if law enforcement resources are 
fixed, profiling will reduce total crime “only if the ratio of the minority to white motorist population is greater than 
the differential of the change in offending by race.” This will depend on the groups’ elasticity of offending to 
policing and their natural offending rates. Id. at 1279, 1281-82, 1296, and 1306. 
resources; and (iii) does not produce a “ratchet effect”109 on the profiled population.110 
Unfortunately, the data does not allow us to determine directly whether highway profiling meets 
these conditions. But drawing from other data sources, Harcourt argues that it probably does not. 
Minority drivers likely have slightly lower elasticities of offending to policing than white 
drivers111 as well as slightly higher natural offending rates.112 As a consequence, racial profiling 
is likely to both increase the crime rate (due to diminished deterrence of white drivers) and cause 
a ratchet effect in minority populations (resulting in disproportionate arrests and convictions over 
and above any natural higher offending rate).113 As Harcourt notes, this increase in negative 
contacts with police “will aggravate the disproportional representation of minorities in the 
correctional population, more unevenly distribute criminal records, supervision, and post-
punitive collateral consequences, and significantly boost the public perception that minorities are 
drug users, traffickers, and couriers.”114 
109 A “ratchet effect” occurs when profiling “produces a supervised population that is disproportionate to 
the distribution of offending by racial group.” Id. at 1329. By unjustifiably targeting group members, profiling may 
increase the group’s crime rate (as measured by arrest or conviction rates, not actual offending, since the former is 
always a fraction of the latter), thereby providing (false) justification for further wasteful profiling. 
110 Id. at 1279-80. 
111 This may result from minorities having fewer non-criminal employment opportunities as well as cultural 
factors. Id. at 1282, 1299, 1356-57. See also Persico, supra note 102 at 1474. 
112 This is largely a product of greater minority participation in drug trafficking. Harcourt, supra note 107, 
at 1282, 1371. 
113 Id. at 1282, 1297-99, 1330-35, 1371-73. 
114 Id. at 1282. See also id. at 1329-31 as well as Dominitz, supra note 102, at 425 (“[W]hen police officers 
use race-ethnicity in stop and search decisions, the rate of apprehension of the guilty will be higher for those groups 
that are searched at a higher rate . . .”). Note that Harcourt’s approach does not require making a distinction between 
biased and statistical profiling. In his estimation, the evidence shows that profiling, whatever the police’s 
motivation, is likely inefficient and counterproductive. As he states at 1306-07, “[i]If targeting minority motorists 
increases long-term offending on the highways or the overall costs to society, then it is in effect racially prejudiced. 
It may be inadvertent and mistaken, but it is effectively racist because it uses a racial category without any benefit to 
society.”  
 It has also been argued that racial profiling (whether biased or statistical) may also lead to higher rates of 
false arrests among minorities. Tomic and Hakes report that dismissal rates for African Americans charged with 
offences typically associated with racial profiling are higher than those for whites as well as for African Americans 
Search and seizure law is neither the only nor the most direct means of combatting 
discriminatory profiling.115 But it is very difficult to mitigate profiling directly.116 Proving bias in 
any individual case is challenging (to say the least), and evidence of statistical disproportion 
cannot in itself prove that any particular search is illegitimate.117 
One of the most effective ways to diminish discriminatory profiling may therefore be to 
limit the ability of police to conduct discretionary searches. As discussed, if a court finds that an 
investigative technique does not invade a reasonable expectation of privacy, then the technique is 
not a “search” and police may use it without restriction. In applying the reasonable expectation 
of privacy test to a novel search technique, courts should therefore consider the extent to which 
the technique is likely to be used in a discriminatory manner.  
 Decision-making error – Constitutional provisions in the Canada and the United States 
command courts to protect people against unreasonable governmental searches and seizures. 
These provisions, of course, are not the only sources of such protection. In both countries, 
legislatures regulate search powers exercised by executive authorities, and those authorities 
regulate themselves with various non-legal mechanisms, including official policies and informal 
 
charged with other offences. This disparity is lower in counties with a greater proportion of African American police 
officers as well as in those with locally-elected judges and high proportions of African Americans. See Aleksandar 
Tomic & Jahn K. Hakes, Case Dismissed: New Evidence in Racial Profiling (September 2004) at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=618122. 
115 See generally RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 138-63 (1997); David M. Tanovich, 
Using the Charter to Stop Racial Profiling: The Development of an Equality Based Conception of Arbitrary 
Detention, 40 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 145 (2002); Kent Roach, Making Progress on Understanding and Remedying 
Racial Profiling, 41 ALTA. L. REV. 895 (2004); Tim Quigley, Brief Investigatory Detentions: A Critique of R. v. 
Simpson, 41 ALTA. L. REV. 935 (2004); Sujit Choudhy, Protecting Equality in the Face of Terror: Ethnic and 
Racial Profiling and s. 15 of the Charter, in THE SECURITY OF FREEDOM: ESSAYS ON CANADA’S ANTI-TERRORISM 
BILL 367 (Ronald J.Daniels, et al, eds. 2001)  
116 See Stuntz, supra note 87, at 2162-63, 2177-79. 
117 Id. But see Brown, 64 O.R. ¶ 45 (“[W]here the evidence shows that the circumstances relating to a 
detention correspond to the phenomenon of racial profiling and provide a basis for the court to infer that the police 
officer is lying about why he or she singled out the accused person for attention, the record is then capable of 
norms. Microeconomic analysis and its public law offshoot, public choice theory, can help 
determine which branch of government is best placed to undertake such regulation. Cost-benefit 
calculations are made by self-interested decisionmakers with imperfect information.118 Judges 
share these imperfections, but they have some capacity to develop rules that take their own and 
others’ weaknesses into account.119 Identifying the biases and information-gathering deficits of 
courts, legislatures, and police should reduce the frequency and magnitude of the errors that the 
reasonable expectation of privacy test inevitably generates. 
 The deficits of police are obvious. While they may face pressure to avoid egregious 
privacy intrusions, the incentives bearing on them tilt heavily against investigative restraint. As 
individuals and institutions, police are rewarded primarily for minimizing crime, and the benefits 
of intrusive search techniques in achieving this objective are clear. In contrast, apart from 
budgetary constraints, the social costs of surveillance (such as those detailed above) are abstract, 
diffuse, and largely externalized; police accordingly have little incentive to either discover or 
take them into account in exercising discretionary investigative powers.120 Police also lack the 
institutional means to perform the kind of comprehensive cost-benefit analysis that the 
reasonable expectation of privacy test entails. Consequently, while crime control interests must 
obviously be considered in applying the reasonable expectation of privacy test, courts should not 
show any significant degree of deference to police assessments of the necessity of a search 
 
supporting a finding that the stop was based on racial profiling.”). 
118 See generally JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962); Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence 
of Public Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV. 873 (1987). 
119 See generally Cass R. Sunstein & Edna Ullmann-Margalit, Second Order Decisions, in BEHAVIORAL 
LAW AND ECONOMICS 187 (Cass R. Sunstein, ed. 2000). 
120 See Brown, supra note 93, at 361; Stuntz, supra note 87, at 2179 
technique. 
 Legislatures and courts are primarily responsible, therefore, for attaining an optimal 
balance between privacy and crime control. The key question for judges in applying the 
reasonable expectation of privacy test, then, is to what extent they should defer to legislative 
decisions to regulate or decline to regulate a particular investigative technique. 
 Legislatures generally have better access than courts to information important to accurate 
decision-making in this area. This information comes in two varieties. First, unlike judges, 
legislators are politically accountable, and are thus in a better position to gauge citizens’ 
preferences for privacy and crime control. Second, legislatures have better access to information 
on the nature and effects of investigative methods. This advantage is especially apparent in the 
context of novel, technologically sophisticated search tools. In dealing with such matters, 
legislatures typically seek input from a variety of sources, including not only law enforcement 
agencies but also industry, advocacy groups, academics, technical experts, and the general 
public.121 The ability of courts to obtain expert assistance and canvass the views of diverse 
stakeholders is much more limited.122 
Legislatures are also typically able to deal with new technologies more quickly than 
courts. Most judicial rule-making is performed by appellate courts, which usually encounter 
novel search technologies many years after they are in use, and even then only if relevant cases 
are tried and appealed.123 By this time the factual record undergirding the rule-making process 
 
121 See e.g. SUMMARY OF SUBMISSIONS TO THE LAWFUL ACCESS CONSULTATION (Nevis Consulting Group, 
ed., 2003). 
122 See Kerr, supra note 44, at 875-76; Stephen Breyer, Our Democratic Constitution, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV.
245, 261-63 (2002). See also Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretations and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. 
REV. 885 (2003); William J. Stuntz, Accountable Policing (February 21, 2006), at http://ssrn.com/abstract=886170. 
123 See Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for 
may be outdated.124 Legislation is also often overtaken by technological developments; but here 
as well legislatures are better equipped to respond flexibly to changing circumstances. Unlike 
courts, legislatures can adopt measures to ensure that statutory provisions are periodically 
reviewed. Courts, in contrast, are constrained by stare decisis,125 and in the realm of 
constitutional interpretation, they also impose constraints on legislative action.126 
All of this suggests that courts should be reluctant to usurp the legislature’s capacity to 
regulate the use of novel search technologies as it sees fit. Public choice scholarship teaches us, 
however, that the legislative process may be skewed in favour of motivated and powerful interest 
groups.127 Consequently, the interests of groups disproportionately harmed by legislation may be 
systematically discounted.128 It is often asserted, for example, that the legislative process 
operates as a one-way ratchet in the criminal sphere.129 On this view, legislatures respond 
 
Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 868-69 (2004). 
124 See Stuart Minor Benjamin, Stepping Into the Same River Twice: Rapidly Changing Facts and the 
Appellate Process, 78 TEX. L. REV. 269, 272 (1999). 
125 See Kerr, supra note 123, at 871-73. Many of the enhanced investigative powers enacted by Congress 
and Parliament in the immediate aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, for example, were made 
subject to “sunset” clauses mandating expiry after a certain period absent legislative renewal. See Uniting and 
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot) 
Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272, §§ 202, 206, 209, 212, 214, 215, 217, 218, 220; Criminal Code, § 
83.32. 
126 See Stuntz, supra note 122, at 34-41. 
127 See generally PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW: READINGS AND COMMENTARY (Maxwell L. Stearns, 
ed., 1997); MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 
(1965); DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1991). 
128 See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980). As William Stuntz has put it 
“[a]nytime the government does something that has concentrated costs but diffused benefits, there is a danger that it 
will do too much – harming one voter to please ten is generally thought to be a good deal from the point of view of 
politically accountable decisionmakers.” Stuntz, supra note 122, at 2165. 
129 See Donald A. Dripps, Criminal Procedure, Footnote Four, and the Theory of Public Choice; or, Why 
Don’t Legislatures Give a Damn About the Rights of the Accused? 44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1079 (1993); Stephen B. 
Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence not for the Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 
1835, 1870 (1994); Charles Ogletree, Jr., An Essay on the New Public Defender for the 21st Century, 58 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 81, 83-85 (1995). But see Stuntz, supra note 122, at 19 (“Contrary to the popular wisdom, 
criminal suspects are a powerful interest group.”). 
robustly to demands for greater investigative powers and harsher sanctions from police, 
prosecutors, victims, and the crime-fearing public while ignoring calls from defence lawyers, 
civil libertarians, and academics for greater police regulation and punitive restraint.130 
Some commentators have argued that this may often be true of search and seizure laws, 
which as we have seen sometimes impose disproportionate costs on politically marginal groups 
(such as certain racial and ethnic minorities).131 It would be a mistake to assume, however, that 
legislatures are always incapable of tempering demands for intrusive search and surveillance 
powers.132 When a surveillance technique threatens to impose substantial costs on a broad or 
politically powerful segment of the population, the legislature will often be pressured to regulate 
it.133 Indeed, in most cases Congress has regulated new search technologies long before the 
courts have encountered them.134 And in cases where the Supreme Court has found that a 
technology does not invade a reasonable expectation of privacy, Congress has often intervened to 
regulate it. For example, after the Court held that pen registers are not Fourth Amendment 
searches,135 Congress responded with legislation prohibiting their use without a court order.136 
130 See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 553-56 
(2001); KENT ROACH, DUE PROCESS AND VICTIMS’ RIGHTS: THE NEW LAW AND POLITICS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
(1999). 
131 See Wasserstrom & Seidman, supra note 10, at 93-104. See also MICHAEL H. TONRY, MALIGN 
NEGLECT: RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA (1995). 
132 See generally Ronald F. Wright, Parity of Resources for Defence Counsel and the Reach of Public 
Choice Theory, 90 IOWA L. REV. 219, 254-60 (2004) (arguing that legislators can sometimes be motivated to enact 
criminal defendant-friendly legislation); Kerr, supra note 123, at 839-58 (noting that Congress, and not the courts, 
has taken the lead in providing privacy in the face of novel search technologies). 
133 See generally Stuntz, supra note 122, at 19 and 53. Stuntz also points out that there is a considerable 
body of legislation designed to redress the kinds of police abuses (such as racial profiling) that are 
disproportionately visited on minorities. Id. at 22-24. See also Stuntz, supra note 87, at 2165-66. 
134 See Kerr, supra note 122 at 870-82; Stuntz, supra note 122 at 21-22. 
135 Smith, 442 U.S.  
Similarly, after lower courts found no reasonable expectation of privacy in cordless telephone 
conversations,137 Congress enacted provisions protecting them.138 And after the Supreme Court 
concluded that bank records attract no reasonable expectation of privacy,139 Congress prohibited 
authorities from obtaining them without a subpoena, warrant, or formal written request providing 
grounds for the search.140 
In the pre-Charter era, the Canadian Parliament was similarly proactive in protecting 
privacy against intrusive surveillance technologies.141 This effort lagged somewhat in the first 
two decades after the passage of the Charter, when Parliament was forced to respond to a series 
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reasonable suspicion. See James A. Adams, Overview of Chapter 206. Pen Registers and Trap and Trace Devices,
18 US NITA prec 3121. Courts may not exclude evidence, moreover, on the basis that it was obtained in violation of 
this legislation. See United States v. Thompson, 936 F.2d 1249 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 117 L. Ed. 2d 139, 
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137 See United States. v. Smith, 978 F.2d 171, 177-81 (5th Cir. 1995); Tyler v. Behrodt, 877 F.2d 705, 706 
(8th Cir. 1989); United States v. McNulty, 47 F.3d 100, 104-06 (4th Cir. 1995). 
138 See Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-414, § 202(a), 108 Stat. 
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139 Miller, 425 U.S.. 
140 Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978 [RFPA], 12 U.S.C. § 3402 et seq. (2006). See generally 
Securities and Exchange Commission v. Jerry T. O’Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735, 745-46 (1984). To obtain banking 
records, the government must have “reason to believe that the records sought are relevant to a legitimate law 
enforcement inquiry.” See 12 U.S.C. §§ 3405, 3407, and 3408 (2006). This standard is lower than probable cause. 
See Hunt v. United States Sec. & Exchange Com. 520 F.Supp 580 (1981, ND Tex). Again, evidence obtained in 
violation of these provisions is not subject to suppression at trial. See 12 U.S.C. § 3417(d) (2006) (“The remedies 
and sanctions described in this chapter shall be the only authorized judicial remedies and sanctions for violations of 
this chapter.”); United States v. Daccarett, 6 F.3d 37 at 52 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1207 (1994) (only 
remedy under RFPA is provided in statute); United States v. Frazin, 780 F.2d 1461, 1466 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 844 (1986) (same). 
141 See Protection of Privacy Act, S.C. 1973-74, c. 50 (prohibiting the interception of private 
communications, providing procedure for obtaining wiretap warrants, and prohibiting admission of evidence 
obtained in contravention of warrant requirements). 
of assertive section 8 decisions by the Supreme Court.142 Yet even during this period, Parliament 
took the lead over the courts in protecting privacy in a number of areas. After two courts found 
that pen registers did not invade a reasonable expectation of privacy,143 Parliament authorized the 
issuance of “number recorder” warrants on the basis of reasonable suspicion.144 And after one 
court determined that wireless telephone communications might not be subject to the same 
statutory protections as land line calls,145 Parliament passed legislation clarifying that most 
wireless calls are protected.146 
Courts should generally be reluctant, then, to preempt the legislature’s decision to 
regulate (or decline to regulate) novel surveillance techniques. They should be especially 
deferential when dealing with sophisticated and rapidly changing search technologies whose 
 
142 As discussed, in Duarte, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 30, the Court struck down what was then s. 178.11 of the 
Criminal Code, which exempted participant surveillance from the prohibition of warrantless electronic surveillance. 
The Criminal Code was subsequently amended to permit warrantless participant surveillance in two circumstances: 
(i) as protection for undercover agents (in which case any evidence obtained is inadmissible); and (ii) when police 
obtain a warrant based on reasonable and probable grounds. Criminal Code, §§ 184.1, 184.2. Recall as well that in 
Wong, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 36, the Court held that surreptitious, video-only surveillance (which the Criminal Code has 
never prohibited) of a hotel room invaded a reasonable expectation of privacy. Parliament responded by enacting a 
provision allowing police to obtain warrants to conduct video surveillance on reasonable and probable cause. 
Criminal Code, § 487.01. And in Wise, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 527, the Court concluded that the installation and 
monitoring of a tracking device invaded a reasonable expectation of privacy. Parliament soon thereafter authorized 
the granting of tracking warrants on the basis of reasonable suspicion. Criminal Code, § 492.1.
143 See R. v. Sampson, 45 Nlfd & P.E.I.R. 32 (Nfld. C.A. 1983); R. v. Fegan, 13 O.R. (3d) 88 (C.A. 1993). 
144 Criminal Code, § 492.2. The provision defines a “number recorder” as “any device that can be used to 
record or identify the telephone number or location of the telephone from which a telephone call originates, or at 
which it is received or is intended to be received.” As mentioned, at least two courts have since held that the use of 
the reasonable suspicion standard in place of reasonable and probable grounds violates s. 8 of the Charter. See 
Nguyen, 2004 BCSC 76; Hackert, [1997] O.J. No. 6384. 
145 See R. v. Solomon, 77 C.C.C. (3d) 264 (Que. Mun. Ct. 1992) (holding that an intercepted wireless 
telephone communication was not a “private communication” within the meaning of Part VI of the Criminal Code as 
the accused could not reasonably have expected that his conversations would not be intercepted).  
146 Section 183 of the Criminal Code now specifies that any radio-based telephone communication that “is 
treated electronically or otherwise for the purpose of preventing intelligible reception by any person other than the 
person intended by the originator to receive it” is a “private communication” subject to the same protections as land-
line telephone communications. Section 184.5 also makes it an offence to intercept radio-based telephone 
communications “maliciously or for gain.” 
social costs are likely to be distributed across a broad segment of society.147 Less deference may 
be warranted when the costs of a technique are likely to be borne disproportionately by “discrete 
and insular minorities” with little political power.148 Concluding that a technique invades a 
reasonable expectation of privacy (and is hence subject to privacy-protecting regulation) 
improves the odds that its costs will be internalized by society as a whole.149 
147 See Stuntz, supra note 87, at 2166; Stephen E. Henderson, Nothing New Under the Sun? A 
Technologically Rational Doctrine of Fourth Amendment Search, 56 MERCER L. REV. 507, 555-56 (2005). This is 
not to say that where the social costs of a privacy-invasive search technique are broadly distributed, legislatures will 
ineluctably choose the optimal level of privacy protection. Like other decisionmakers (including judges), the 
rationality of legislators (and the constituents who elect them) is limited by a number of factors, including 
incomplete and asymmetric information, bounded rationality, and systemic psychological distortions. See Christine 
Jolls, et al. A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 13, 48 (Cass R. 
Sunstein, ed., 2000); Roger G. Noll & James E. Krier, Some Implications of Cognitive Psychology for Risk 
Regulation, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra, at 325, 342-47. There is evidence that cognitive, 
decisional, and informational limitations may lead people to prefer suboptimal levels of privacy protection. While 
the risks of being a victim of crime are typically straightforward, immediate, and highly salient, the risks of privacy 
invasions may often be complex, cumulative, context dependent, and realized far into the future. See Allesandro 
Acquisti, Privacy in Electronic Commerce and the Economics of Immediate Gratification, in Proceedings of the 6th 
Annual ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (2004) at 3-4 at 
http://portal.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=988777&dl=ACM&coll=GUIDE; Acquisti & Grossklags, supra note 75, at 
26-7; Brown, supra note 93, at 343. Judges are just as likely, however, to suffer from these limitations as legislators. 
148 U.S. v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (“Nor need we enquire whether similar 
considerations enter into the review of statutes directed at particular religious ... or racial minorities . . . whether 
prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the 
operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a 
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.”). See also Wasserstrom & Seidman, supra note 10, at 95 (“when 
the privacy costs of law enforcement are spread more widely, and there is a reduced risk that the politically less 
powerful are being forced to bear disproportionate privacy losses, the courts often have allowed searches and 
seizures without prior judicial supervision or particularized suspicion.”). 
149 This assumes that economically privileged, unelected judges are better attuned to the problem of law 
enforcement discrimination than legislators. This assumption has been questioned. See Wasserstrom & Seidman, 
supra note 10, at 100. However, on account of their extensive experience with police-citizen encounters and relative 
insulation from majoritarian pressures, judges may be able to discern differential impacts on privacy that are likely 
to be ignored or discounted by legislators. See generally William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent 
Judiciary in an Interest Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875 (1975). 
IV INFRARED CAMERA SEARCHES 
To illustrate how economically-informed cost-benefit analysis can improve the 
conventional reasonable expectation of privacy test, consider the use of infrared cameras to 
detect indoor marijuana cultivation operations. Recall that in Kyllo, the United States Supreme 
Court held that residential infrared camera searches invade a reasonable expectation of privacy 
and that in Tessling, the Canadian Supreme Court came to the opposite conclusion.150 The 
Tessling Court described the capabilities of infrared cameras as follows: 
FLIR151 technology records images of thermal energy or heat radiating from a 
building. Once a baseline is calibrated, cooler areas show up as dark, and warmer 
areas are lighter. FLIR imaging cannot, at this stage of its development, determine 
the nature of the source of heat within the building. It cannot distinguish between 
heat diffused over an external wall that came originally from a sauna or a pottery 
kiln, or between heat that originated in an overheated toaster or heat from a halide 
lamp. In short, the FLIR camera cannot “see” through the external surfaces of a 
building. . . . However, the substantial amounts of heat generated by marijuana 
growing operations must eventually escape from the building. The FLIR camera 
creates an image of the distribution of escaping heat at a level of detail not 
discernible by the naked eye. A FLIR image, put together with other information, 
can help the police get reasonable and probable grounds to believe that a 
marijuana growing operation is in residence.152 
150 Note that these results do not fit the general pattern of the respective courts’ recent search and seizure 
decisions. The United States court has generally been more accommodating of law enforcement interests than its 
Canadian counterpart. See supra notes 31-74 and accompanying text. It is also worth noting that each of the two 
camps in Kyllo consisted of a curious amalgam of conservatives and liberals. The justices in the majority were 
Justices Scalia, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Chief Justice Renquist, along with Justices O’Connor, 
Stevens, and Kennedy dissented. 
151 “FLIR” stands for “Forward Looking Infra-Red.” See Tessling [2004] 3 S.C.R. ¶ 2. 
152 Tessling [2004] 3 S.C.R. ¶ 5. The device used in Kyllo was described as a “non-intrusive device which 
emits no rays or beams and shows a crude visual image of the heat being radiated from the outside of the house; it 
did not show any people or activity within the walls of the structure; the device used cannot penetrate walls or 
windows to reveal conversations or human activities; and no intimate details of the home were observed.” Kyllo, at 
30, quoting from the evidentiary findings of the District Court (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Though both courts invoked the public exposure and intimacy doctrines, neither doctrine 
proved particularly helpful. Justice Scalia began his majority decision in Kyllo by noting that the 
visual inspection of a dwelling (from any publically accessible vantage point) is not a search.153 
He quickly concluded, however, that infrared searches differ from “naked eye surveillance” 
because they allow police to obtain “information regarding the interior of the home that could 
not otherwise have been obtained without physical ‘intrusion into a constitutionally protected 
area’.”154 Scalia found, in other words, that Kyllo did not voluntarily expose the heat radiating 
from his home to public observation. 
 Justice Stevens, writing for the Kyllo dissenters, took a different approach. In his view, 
infrared cameras do not give police direct access to private information; rather, they merely help 
them to infer what is going on inside residences from “information in the public domain.”155 
Expressly applying the public exposure doctrine, he concluded that infrared camera searches 
could not be constitutionally distinguished from naked eye observations of heat emanations, as 
when someone notices that “one part of a house is warmer than another part or a nearby building 
if, for example, rainwater evaporates or snow melts at different rates across its surfaces.”156 
In Tessling, the Supreme Court of Canada treated the public exposure doctrine with more 
ambivalence. In assessing whether Tessling had a subjective expectation of privacy in his home’s 
thermal profile, Justice Binnie asserted that “allowing” heat to escape does not count as a 
 
153 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 31-3. 
154 Id. at 33-4 (emphasis added; internal citation omitted). 
155 Id. at 41. 
156 Id. at 43. 
knowing or voluntary exposure.157 In determining the objective reasonableness of any 
expectation of privacy, however, he noted that heat loss from external walls is “obvious to even 
the most casual observer”158 and while an infrared camera reveals more detail than is apparent to 
the naked eye, it nonetheless “records only information exposed to the public.”159 
There is no way to determine which of the forgoing approaches is correct. The dissipation 
of thermal energy is inevitable,160 and in many circumstances differential heat production will be 
visually discernable. It is also true that infrared imaging produces a more detailed picture of heat 
distribution than is apparent in the visible part of the electromagnetic spectrum. Attempting to 
categorize the information revealed by infrared searches as “public” or “private” or emanating 
from a home’s “exterior” or “interior” is a fruitless endeavour. 
 It is perhaps for this reason that Tessling Court and the Kyllo dissent focussed on the 
nature of the information obtained by infrared searches, concluding that they revealed only non-
intimate information.161 This argument has some merit. The images in Kyllo and Tessling 
allowed police to make only general inferences about the nature of the activities taking place 
inside the home. Justice Scalia had a point, however, when he stated that “in the home . . . all 
details are intimate details.”162 He questioned whether it would be possible to articulate a 
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161 See Tessling [2004] 3 S.C.R ¶¶ 59-62; Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 42-6, 50-1. 
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standard “specifying which residential activities are ‘intimate’ and which are not.”163 
Assessments of intimacy vary widely depending on subjective preferences, context, and the 
extent to which information from disparate sources is compiled and aggregated. The infrared 
images produced in Kyllo and Tessling were crude, but combined with other information, they 
could nonetheless generate probabilistic inferences about a number of non-criminal activities that 
some people would prefer to keep private.164 While it can be argued that the information 
uncovered by infrared cameras is not especially sensitive, ultimately the intimacy doctrine is 
only marginally more helpful than the public exposure doctrine in deciding whether the 
technology invades a reasonable expectation of privacy. 
 Economic cost-benefit analysis promises to provide a more definitive answer to this 
question.  
 Privacy costs – Consider first the social costs that would ensue if infrared searches were 
held to invade a reasonable expectation of privacy. When a court finds such an expectation, it 
subjects the search technique to constitutional regulation, usually by requiring police to obtain a 
probable cause warrant. Even if we assume that police could obtain infrared warrants on a lesser 
standard (such as reasonable suspicion), the costs would be substantial. Police would be forced to 
rely on more expensive and riskier investigative methods (such as undercover operations) either 
as substitutes for infrared searches or to provide evidentiary foundations for warrant 
 
163 Id. at 38-39. 
164 Justice Scalia asserted, for example, that the infrared technology used in Kyllo may have permitted 
police to determine “at what hour each night the lady of the house takes her daily sauna and bath.” Id. at 38. See also 
United States v. Cusumano, 67 F.3d 1497, 1501 (10th Cir. 1995), vacated and decided on other grounds, 83 F.3d 
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applications.165 Higher costs mean less enforcement and less deterrence.  
 Privacy benefits – Our willingness to bear these costs depends on the magnitude of the 
benefits that a warrant requirement would produce. In the absence of legal privacy protections, 
people may either avoid productive activities or defend their privacy by other means. 
Unrestricted infrared searches are unlikely to produce either avoidance or defensive costs. As 
discussed, even crude infrared images may permit probabilistic inferences about non-criminal 
residential activity, and some may not want police to have unrestricted access to this information. 
But for people who are not growing marijuana, knowing that police might be monitoring heat 
escaping from their homes is unlikely to prompt any behavioural changes, let alone chill 
participation in socially valuable discourse or activity. The fact that electricity consumption 
records have been freely available to police for years does not appear to have prompted people to 
modify their residential activities.166 Similarly, the widespread use of infrared cameras is not 
likely to cause law-abiding individuals to install better insulation or find other means of limiting 
the escape of heat from their homes. 
 The next question is whether regulating infrared searches is likely to prevent suboptimal 
enforcement expenditures. At first blush, the marijuana prohibition might appear to be the kind 
of inefficient law that privacy rights should aim to thwart.167 The economic case for legalizing 
 
generate the observed heat.”). 
165 This remains true even if it is assumed that infrared images must usually be supplemented by 
corroborating evidence to establish probable cause to conduct physical searches. See Tessling, [2004] 3 S.C.R. ¶ 55 
(“at present no warrant could ever properly be granted solely on the basis of a FLIR image.”). Prohibiting infrared 
searches in the absence of reasonable suspicion would increase the need for corroborating evidence. 
166 See Plant, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 281. 
167 There is a hint of this reasoning in the Court of Appeal’s decision in Tessling. See R. v. Tessling, 171 
C.C.C. (3d) 361 ¶ 81 (Ont. C.A. 2003.) (“there has been public, judicial, and political recognition that marijuana is 
marijuana (and perhaps other illicit drugs) is strong.168 There is considerable evidence that the 
costs of enforcement vastly outweigh the harms of consumption.169 But even if this is correct, it 
does not follow that privacy law should be used to hamper the ability of police to detect 
producers. As long as marijuana trafficking remains illegal, a substantial portion of its profits 
will flow to people involved in broader criminal enterprises.170 Restricting infrared searches 
would diminish the risk of detection, thereby lowering the costs of entry into the trade and 
increasing revenues available to finance crimes causing substantial social harm. It would also 
lead to an increase in violence and other criminal activity associated with competition between 
producers.171 If the marijuana prohibition is a bad law, then we should press for its reform or 
abolition – not use privacy law to promote the growth of an illicit market.172 
The discretionary use of infrared searches is also unlikely to encourage discriminatory 
profiling. This most likely to occur when police can readily observe the profiled characteristic 
(such as race) and use it as a proxy for criminality, as in street and vehicle stops, airport security 
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459 (1992). 
171 See Steven D. Levitt & Sudhir Alladi Venkatesh, An Economic Analysis of a Drug-Selling Gang’s 
Finances, 115 QUART. J. ECON. 755 (2000). 
172 The former Canadian government’s proposed legislation decriminalizing the possession of small 
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Act to Amend the Contraventions Act and the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, 1st Sess., 38th Parl., 2004 (first 
reading November 1, 2004). 
checks, and border crossings.173 Police using infrared cameras, in contrast, are less likely to be 
aware of the suspect’s race or ethnicity.174 The immediate targets of the searches, after all, are 
buildings – not people. Further, unlike detentions and physical searches of pedestrians, drivers, 
and air travellers, infrared searches are unlikely to cause innocent suspects to feel 
inconvenienced, embarrassed, or stigmatized (feelings that often generate a profound sense of 
unfairness among the innocent targets of profiling). Indeed, in most cases the innocent subjects 
of infrared searches will never become aware that they have been searched.  
 Decision-making error – Even if the forgoing analysis underestimates the costs or 
overestimates the benefits of unregulated infrared searches, we should still prefer the result in 
Tessling to that in Kyllo. Like many other novel search technologies, the uses and capabilities of 
infrared imaging are changing rapidly.175 These are precisely the circumstances in which courts 
should be reluctant to preempt the legislature’s ability to craft (and adjust) a nuanced and flexible 
regulatory scheme.  
 The majority opinion in Kyllo illustrates the drawbacks of judicial interventionism in the 
realm of high technology. Anxious to set out a firm, bright-line rule capable of anticipating 
future technological developments,176 Justice Scalia proclaimed that “obtaining by sense-
 
173 See sources cited supra note 99. 
174 In cases where police do target members of a minority group in marijuana investigations, evidence of 
discrimination will often be readily apparent. In R. v. Nguyen [2006] O.J. No. 272 (Sup. Ct. Jus.) (QL), for example, 
the court found that a police officer engaged in unconstitutional racial profiling when he obtained from a local land 
registry office a list containing only the names of property owners with Vietnamese surnames. 
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176 See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 36 ( “While the technology used in the present case was relatively crude, the rule 
enhancing technology any information regarding the interior of the home that could not 
otherwise have been obtained without physical ‘intrusion into a constitutionally protected area’ . 
. . constitutes a search – at least where (as here) the technology in question is not in general 
public use.”177 The “general public use” criterion, however, is both vague and normatively 
troubling.178 Since Kyllo was decided, infrared cameras have become more affordable, portable, 
and user-friendly; they are currently used in a wide variety of law enforcement, immigration, 
military, and civilian applications, including construction, manufacturing, testing, and 
inspection.179 How are police, prosecutors, and courts to determine when infrared cameras are so 
ubiquitous as to be in “general public use?” And if the courts eventually decide that they are, 
would this mean that they could never invade a reasonable expectation of privacy, even if they 
become capable of capturing detailed images of residential life?  
 If infrared imaging advances to this point, and if its use by police threatens to generate 
significant avoidance or defensive costs, legislatures can intervene and regulate it. As infrared 
searches have the potential to impact a broad segment of society, the issue is best left to the 
legislative process. Technology enabling police to “see” what is going on inside the home is 
likely to prompt strong political opposition. In these circumstances, legislatures are more likely 
to achieve an optimal balance of privacy and security than the courts.180 
we adopt must take account of more sophisticated systems that are already in use or in development.”). 
177 Id. at 34 (emphasis added). 
178 See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
179 See e.g. FLIR at http://www.flir.com; Advanced Infrared Resources at 
http://www.infraredthermography.com/applicat.htm. 
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V LOCATION TRACKING 
A similar analysis can be performed with respect to a very different surveillance 
technology: location tracking devices. Early iterations of this technology were considered in 
Knotts,181 Karo,182 and Wise.183 Recall that in Knotts and Karo, the United States Supreme Court 
held that tracking suspects with surreptitiously planted radio transmitters (“beepers”) did not 
invade a reasonable expectation of privacy, as long as they did not allow police to monitor 
constitutionally protected areas, such as residences. In Wise, in contrast, the Supreme Court of 
Canada concluded that tracking a suspect’s vehicle over public roads infringed a reasonable 
expectation of privacy, albeit only in a “minimally intrusive” manner.184 
By today’s standards, the technology used in these cases was rudimentary. The Court 
described the beeper used in Wise as follows: 
The device consisted of a low power radio transmitter. From the strength of the 
signal, it was possible to determine the general location of the object to which the 
beeper had been fixed. By moving in the direction of the transmitter and adjusting 
the “RF gain control,” the location could be more precisely determined. The 
device used in this case was not capable of indicating if the object being tracked 
was to the right, left, front or back of the receiver of the signal.  
 
The evidence in this case was that the device was used intermittently as a back-up 
for visual surveillance of the appellant’s car . . . particularly to attempt to locate 
the vehicle when visual surveillance failed. Since the device was not capable of 
pinpointing the vehicle with any degree of precision, physical surveillance was 
always required to fix its proximate position.185 
181 460 U.S. 276. 
182 468 U.S. 705. 
183 [1992] 1 S.C.R. 527. 
184 Id. at 538. 
185 Id. at 434-35. The capabilities of the devices used in Knotts and Karo were roughly similar. In both 
cases the beeper was used as a supplement to, and not a complete substitute for, traditional physical surveillance. 
Tracking devices are now much more powerful and precise. Two sophisticated 
technologies are already in widespread use: the Global Positioning System (GPS) and wireless 
telephone networks.186 Like traditional beepers, these technologies use radio waves to establish a 
connection between devices at unknown locations and devices at known locations. The newer 
technologies, however, have two critical advantages over beepers. Unlike a beeper, which must 
remain within a certain distance of its tracking receiver, GPS and wireless phone tracking 
devices are linked to an extensive, permanent network of transceivers. This allows police to track 
suspects from a remote, stationary location, thus eliminating the need for mobile, physical 
surveillance.187 Second, because GPS devices and wireless phones can send data to and receive 
data from multiple network nodes simultaneously, the suspect’s precise location can be 
determined mathematically.188 As noted in Wise, a beeper’s location can only be inferred 
imprecisely by gauging the strength of its signal. 
 
186 There are a number of other widely-used technologies that allow police to determine suspects’ locations, 
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David J. Phillips, Beyond Privacy: Confronting Locational Surveillance in Wireless Communication, 8 COMM. L. & 
The GPS network consists of at least two dozen satellites, owned by the United States 
government and used initially for exclusively military purposes, that are now freely available for 
a variety of civilian navigational uses.189 GPS devices can determine location with a great deal of 
precision. Depending on the equipment used, distances covered, and other variables, they can 
currently determine location (longitude, latitude, and altitude) to within a few metres.190 The 
accuracy of GPS tracking has improved steadily over the years, and further improvement is 
expected. Police may either surreptitiously install GPS receivers on suspects’ vehicles or 
possessions191 or obtain real-time or historical data generated by commercial GPS devices, such 
as those installed in vehicles and wireless phones.192 
Wireless telephones are also capable of being conscripted by police for use as tracking 
devices, even when they are not equipped with GPS devices. Whenever they are turned on, 
wireless (or “cell”) phones automatically and periodically communicate with a network of base 
and switching stations.193 These communications, which are carried on a dedicated channel 
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separate from the voice and data communications sent or received by the phone’s user, connect 
the phone to the network and allow it to switch channels when it moves from one cell area to 
another.194 The accuracy of non-GPS wireless phone tracking varies widely, depending on a 
number of factors, including the sophistication of the technology and the number of stations 
within range of the phone. Many contemporary systems can determine location (longitude and 
latitude) to within fifty metres,195 and future systems will undoubtedly be even more precise.196 
194 See In re Application for Pen Register and Trap/trace Device with Cell Site Location Authority, 396 F. 
Supp. 2d 747, 750-51 (Magis. Ct., S.D. Texas, 2005) [Application for Pen Register]. 
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Location Initiative, 10 Va. J.L. & TECH. 1 ¶¶ 14-21 (2005); Phillips, supra note 188, at 3-5; Application for Pen 
Register, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 756 (“This inexorable combination of market and regulatory stimuli ensures that cell 
phone tracking will become more precise with each passing year.”). 
 The United States Congress has also required wireless service providers to facilitate law enforcement by 
ensuring that their systems can record the location of the antenna tower connected to a telephone at the beginning 
and end of each call. See 47 U.S.C. § 1002 (2006); Federal Communications Commission, Third Report & Order, In 
the Matter of Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, 14 FCC Rcd 16794 (1999) [Third Report & 
Order]; United States Telecom Association v. Federal Communications Commission, 227 F.3d 450, 462-64 (D.C. 
Cir. 2000). Notably, however, the Federal Communications Commission rejected the argument that providers must 
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16816 P 46 (1999). 
 To date, Canadian regulators have not imposed specific requirements for wireless 911 location tracking, 
other than to require new providers to meet the capacities of established ones. See Gordon Gow, Public Safety 
Telecommunications in Canada: Regulatory Intervention in the Development of Wireless E9-1-1, 30 CAN. J. COMM.
65 (2004). Consequently, Canada has lagged behind the United States in the development of wireless 911 systems. 
While municipal governments and wireless and wireline service providers have voluntarily cooperated to develop 
systems, few providers are currently able to transmit precise location information to emergency operators. See Colin 
J. Bennett & Lori Crowe, Location Based Services and the Surveillance of Mobility: An Analysis of Privacy Risks in 
Canada (June 2005) 9-14 at http://web.uvic.ca/polisci/bennett/pdf/LBSFINAL.pdf. 
 Canadian wireless service providers are required to be capable of recording, for law enforcement purposes, 
the most accurate location information available to them. This obligation stems from unpublished licensing 
conditions (SOLICITOR GENERAL’S ENFORCEMENT STANDARDS FOR LAWFUL INTERCEPTION OF 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS (Rev. Nov. 95)) imposed by Ministerial fiat pursuant to s. 5 of the Radiocommunication 
Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. R-2. See generally INDUSTRY CANADA, SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
POLICY: SPECTRUM LICENSING POLICY FOR CELLULAR AND INCUMBENT PERSONAL COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES 
(PCS) (December 2003) at 10-1, at http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/epic/internet/insmt-
As with GPS tracking, police may obtain wireless telephone location data in real time197 or from 
historical records maintained by service providers.198 They may also use commercial wireless 
networks to track devices surreptitiously placed on vehicles or other objects.199 
The question, then, is whether courts should find that these “second generation” radio 
tracking systems invade a reasonable expectation of privacy. As in the case of infrared searches, 
the conventional, morally grounded approach is not particularly helpful. Consider first the public 
exposure doctrine. By definition, people who venture into public spaces (such as streets and 
highways) voluntarily subject their movements and behaviours to observation. It could easily be 
argued that it is unreasonable to expect one’s public activities to remain private. Indeed, at least 
one court has seized on this syllogism in concluding that cell phone tracking does not trigger 
Fourth Amendment protection.200 
gst.nsf/vwapj/pcspolicy_dec16_e_final.pdf/$FILE/pcspolicy_dec16_e_final.pdf; Richard-Philippe Martel, Privacy 
on the Air (paper presented to the “Wireless Millennium” Spectrum 20/20 Conference, Ottawa, 3 December 1998), 
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http://www.privcom.gc.ca/speech/archive/02_05_a_981203_e.asp?V=Print#Wireless%20Mobile%20Communicatio
n%20Technologies%20Reveal%20Where%20We%20Go. 
 Improvements in wireless telephone tracking are also being spurred by commercial marketing strategies, 
including the placement on people’s phones of advertising and other content tied to their consumer profile and real-
time location. See Phillips, supra note 188, at 12; Laurie Thomas Lee, Can Police Track Your Wireless Calls? Call 
Location Information and Privacy Law, 21 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT L.J. 381, 381-82 (2003); Stephen E. Henderson, 
Learning from All Fifty States: How to Apply the Fourth Amendment and its State Analogs to Protect Third-Party 
Information from Unreasonable Search, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 373, 382-84 (2006). In the United States, however, 
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absence of customers’ explicit consent. See Wireless Communications and Public Safety Act of 1999, 47 U.S.C. § 
222(f) (2006). 
197 Investigators seeking prospective wireless telephone location data usually obtain it from service 
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Manual, at 44-45 (rev. June 2005), cited in Application for Pen Register, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 755. 
198 See e.g. Application for Pen Register, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 748-49. 
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As many commentators have pointed out, however, the public exposure doctrine fails to 
account for the fact that electronic tracking threatens the sense of anonymity that people often 
enjoy in public spaces.201 While we necessarily take the risk that our public behaviour will be 
observed by others, these observations are typically sporadic and fleeting. As I discuss in more 
detail below, GPS and wireless telephone tracking systems allow authorities to surreptitiously 
monitor and record people’s movements in a systematic and detailed manner over an indefinite 
period of time. This kind of intensive surveillance is not analogous to the passing observations of 
strangers. Applying the public exposure doctrine to modern tracking technologies may thus fail 
to confer a normatively attractive degree of privacy. 
 The intimacy doctrine is similarly unhelpful. People’s public movements typically reveal 
only mundane information about them. Of course, this is not always true. Many people would 
not want it known that they had visited a psychiatric institution, gay bar, adult video store, an 
extramarital lover’s home, or a political or religious meeting. Arguably, using location tracking 
technologies to obtain this kind of information invades a reasonable expectation of privacy 
because it relates to “biographical core of personal information” revealing “intimate details” of 
“lifestyle or private decisions.”202 
The problem with this argument, however, is that while intimate personal information 
may be obtained by sophisticated tracking technologies, it may also be obtained by 
unsophisticated, conventional surveillance. No reasonable expectation of privacy is triggered 
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when police discover extremely sensitive personal information by simply observing a suspect in 
public spaces. Yet it is reasonable to argue, as I elaborate in detail below, that electronic tracking 
should not be permitted without a warrant. Measuring the intimacy of the information that 
tracking technologies reveal, in other words, is of little assistance in deciding whether they 
invade a reasonable expectation of privacy.203 
As in the case of infrared searches, cost-benefit analysis is more helpful.  
 Privacy costs – Consider first the social costs associated with recognizing a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in relation to tracking devices. Doing so would cause policing to become 
more expensive, less effective, or both. Contemporary technologies permit police to monitor 
suspects’ movements with a great deal of precision,204 over a vast spatial expanse,205 and for very 
long periods of time.206 The financial costs to police of using these technologies, moreover, are 
relatively modest.207 
202 Plant, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 281. 
203 See generally Bennett & Crowe, supra note 196, at 36-7. 
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207 The costs associated with electronic tracking depend on a variety of factors, including the sophistication 
of the technology and whether police use their own systems or co-opt those of commercial service providers. As 
discussed in the text below, it most circumstances these costs are very likely to be significantly lower than those 
associated with analogous forms of surveillance. 
The most obvious substitute for prospective208 electronic tracking is visual surveillance. 
If police are interested only in obtaining location information, electronic tracking is far superior 
to visual surveillance. Compared to visual surveillance, it requires less manpower, is more 
reliable (there is typically less danger of “losing” the target), and carries a lower risk of 
detection. These advantages multiply when police track the movements of several people at 
once. Without electronic tracking, this would typically require a substantial deployment of 
manpower. With it, it could require only a single officer manning a video monitor. 
 If police want to do more than simply track a suspect’s location (for instance, if they also 
want to interdict a drug transaction), or if the location information generated by electronic 
tracking is insufficiently precise, they may still need to deploy officers on the ground to conduct 
visual surveillance. In such cases, however, electronic tracking may still be helpful. 
Supplementing visual surveillance with electronic tracking allows police to use fewer officers 
and follow suspects from greater distances and more discreet vantage points.  
 The social costs of recognizing a reasonable expectation of privacy in retrospective209 
electronic tracking are even greater than for prospective tracking, as there is no ready “low tech” 
substitute for retrospectively tracking a suspect’s movements. Retrospective location information 
is most commonly obtained from wireless telephone service providers. A suspect’s whereabouts 
at a given time in the past can sometimes be determined by other means, such as questioning the 
 
208 By “prospective” tracking I mean situations where police target suspects for surveillance and then 
capture location information from that time forward. Police may either track suspects in real-time or analyze 
location data at any time after it has been recorded. 
209 By “retrospective” tracking I mean situations where police obtain location information for a period 
during which they had not tracked a suspect’s location. Retrospective location information thus always derives from 
either records kept by third parties or less commonly, suspects themselves (as in the case of information inputted by 
suspects into their own GPS devices). 
suspect or other people or obtaining credit card, banking, or other transactional records. 
Questioning may tip off the suspect, however, and result in the loss or destruction of evidence. 
More importantly, none of these methods provides the kind of continuous, historical record of 
the suspect’s movements available from wireless providers.210 If retrospective location tracking 
were held to invade a reasonable expectation of privacy, police lacking grounds to obtain a 
warrant would have to resort to much more costly, risky, and intrusive methods, such as 
undercover questioning.211 
Privacy benefits – Would the widespread use of location tracking technologies create 
substantial avoidance or defensive costs? While it is difficult to be definitive, the answer is most 
likely “yes.” As mentioned, people who venture out into public spaces subject themselves to 
observation by others, including police. People take this into account, of course, often behaving 
differently in public than they would in private.212 
The chilling effects of this kind of observation are limited, however. While subject to 
observation, in most public spaces we enjoy anonymity. Others may see us doing something 
stigmatizing, but if they do not know who we are, this information is unlikely to be used against 
 
210 Wireless providers currently keep records (for varying lengths of time) of subscribers’ locations that are 
accurate to within approximately 300 yards. See Richtel, supra note 193. European Union member states recently 
agreed to enact legislation requiring telecommunications service providers to retain records of telephone and internet 
communications envelope data (including location data) for 6-24 months. See EC, Directive 2006/24/EC of 15 
March 2006 on the retention of data generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly available 
electronic communications services or of public communications networks and amending Directive 2002/58/EC,
[2006] O.J. L. 105/54. To date, there have not been any concrete proposals to enact similar legislation in the United 
States or Canada. 
211 The effectiveness of GPS and wireless telephone tracking, it should be noted, may be blunted by 
defensive measures. Criminals may switch off GPS chips in their cell phones, inspect possessions for planted 
tracking devices, use anonymous wireless phone services, or conduct business in places beyond the range of 
tracking systems. These measures impose costs, however, and may thereby diminish the rate of criminal activity. 
212 See Stigler, supra note 14, at 627. 
us. This anonymity frees people, as Melvin Gutterman has put it, to “merge into the ‘situational 
landscape.’”213 Contemporary electronic tracking technologies threaten this freedom. Police 
could monitor an area for active transceivers (such as those embedded in wireless telephones or 
GPS-equipped vehicles), and if a person’s location or movements attracted their attention for 
some reason, his or her identity could be determined by cross-referencing the transceiver’s 
identification number with subscriber databases.  
 As discussed, public scrutiny is also typically brief and episodic. Our public behaviour 
may be observed, but any one observer will generally only obtain a small fragment of 
information about us. And if our activities are subject to prolonged, unwanted observation, we 
can usually take steps to preserve our privacy. Surreptitious visual observation is difficult, and in 
most cases people can confront or elude their observer. With GPS and wireless telephone 
tracking, in contrast, people generally do not know whether they are being monitored. These 
systems are also able to continuously track people’s movements over both an extensive 
geographic space and lengthy period of time. This kind of surveillance may reveal patterns, 
associations, and activities that would not be apparent to casual observers.214 
Further, even when we observe non-anonymous, stigmatizing public behaviour (for 
example, seeing a neighbour entering an adult video store), the person observed may be able to 
credibly deny the transgression to others.215 Location tracking technologies, however, can 
 
213 Gutterman, supra note 24, at 706. 
214 See State v. Jackson, 76 P.3d 217, 262 (Wash. S.C. 2003); Otterberg, supra note 189, at 696-98. See 
also Blitz, supra note 201, at 1409-10; Nissenbaum, supra note 201, at 576-77. 
215 See Commonwealth v. Schaeffer, 536 A.2d 354, 365 (1987), cited in Duarte, [1990] 1 S.C.R. at 51 (“if 
people in society come to believe [that participant surveillance] is widespread and done without probable cause, they 
may begin to fall silent on many occasions when previously they would have felt free to speak, confident in the 
generate reliable, permanent records, dramatically diminishing people’s ability to successfully 
challenge harmful accusations. 
 Lastly, for most non-criminals, the risk of being subjected to prolonged visual 
surveillance by police is highly remote. Police resources are limited, and they are thus unlikely to 
monitor people who are not strongly suspected of criminal activity.216 But as I have discussed, 
contemporary tracking systems can inexpensively and continuously monitor many subjects over 
an extensive geographic space. This could enable the efficient monitoring of people who are only 
very weakly suspected of criminal activity. Police could use GPS or wireless telephone systems, 
for example, to track the movements of anyone carrying a transceiver in a “high crime” area or 
the proximity of a suspected criminal or terrorist. 
 The non-anonymous, continuous, surreptitious, geographically and temporally extensive, 
reliable, and inexpensive character of GPS and wireless telephone tracking has the potential, 
therefore, to induce a much greater chill on productive behaviour than visual observation. If there 
is a realistic possibility that police may monitor and record visitations to psychiatric clinics, 
AIDS testing centres, needle exchanges, women’s shelters, mosques, and the like, then some 
people who would otherwise have engaged in valuable activities in these places will not do so.217 
The avoidance costs associated with location tracking are potentially quite substantial. 
 If the possibility of being monitored by does not cause a person to avoid valuable 
 
belief that they could challenge the credibility or memory of the trusted colleague who would betray them.”). 
216 See Otterberg, supra note 189, at 695. 
217 GPS and wireless telephone tracking systems are being integrated with sophisticated mapping systems 
that correlate location with virtually any other kind of information relevant to police or emergency services 
personnel, such as crime statistics, business and housing types, and vehicle traffic data. See Phillips, supra note 188, 
at 5. 
activities, that person may nevertheless expend resources to prevent surveillance. Like criminals, 
non-criminals may attempt to thwart electronic location tracking, especially when they are 
engaged in sensitive activities. People may, for example, turn off their wireless phones or GPS 
devices. In doing so, however, they would forgo the many benefits conferred by these 
technologies. This must count as a significant cost of failing to regulate electronic tracking.  
 We must next ask whether the judicial regulation of tracking technologies is likely to 
prevent inefficient law enforcement expenditures. Unlike infrared cameras, which are used to 
detect only one form of criminal activity (indoor marijuana cultivation) electronic tracking is 
used in many different types of investigations. Most of these involve crimes that everyone agrees 
should be prohibited. Like wiretapping, however, electronic tracking captures a great deal of 
information about innocent activity. This creates a risk that police will use tracking technologies 
to monitor non-criminal behaviour. Before the widespread adoption of statutory and 
constitutional protections against warrantless wiretapping, it was not uncommon for authorities 
to use it to monitor and intimidate members of unorthodox political groups.218 And there is 
evidence that public video surveillance systems are frequently used to observe and harass 
minorities, women, and the poor.219 Of course, regulating surveillance technologies cannot 
guarantee that they will not be misused; but it does make it difficult to establish the kind of 
 
218 See e.g. Developments in the Law – The National Security Interest and Civil Liberties: IV. Covert 
Government Surveillance, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1244 (1972); David Berry, The First Amendment and Law 
Enforcement Infiltration of Political Groups, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 207 (1982); Athan G. Theoharis, FBI Surveillance: 
Past and Present, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 883 (1984); COMMISSION OF INQUIRY CONCERNING CERTAIN ACTIVITIES OF 
THE ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE, CERTAIN R.C.M.P. ACTIVITIES AND THE QUESTION OF GOVERNMENTAL 
KNOWLEDGE : THIRD REPORT / COMMISSION OF INQUIRY CONCERNING CERTAIN ACTIVITIES OF THE ROYAL 
CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE (1981). 
219 See e.g. Clive Norris & Gary Armstrong, MAXIMUM SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY: THE RISE OF CCTV 108-
16 (1999); John Fiske, Surveilling the City: Whiteness, the Black Man and Democratic Totalitarianism, 15:2 
extensive surveillance networks that facilitate widespread abuse. 
 There are other tools available to minimize abuses of surveillance technologies,220 
especially when it is clear that police have targeted subjects for personal or political ends. 
Abuses are much more difficult to detect, however, when minorities are targeted in legitimate 
criminal investigations. As discussed, discriminatory profiling is most common in face-to-face 
confrontations between police and minorities, as in street and vehicle stops. These encounters 
often cause innocent suspects to feel embarrassed, stigmatized, and unfairly treated.  
 As in the case of infrared searches, police engaged in electronic tracking may not be 
aware of the race or ethnicity of the people being monitored. The unique identifier of the 
monitored transceivers, however, can be linked to users’ identities, which can in turn be linked to 
databases containing information on race, ethnicity, and religious affiliation. Police can also 
supplement electronic tracking with visual surveillance, for example when they judge an 
individual’s movements to be suspicious. In such cases they may disproportionately select 
minorities for further investigation or surveillance. So while electronic tracking is less likely to 
cause discriminatory profiling than street or vehicle stops, it is more likely to do so than infrared 
searches. 
 To summarize, failing to regulate GPS and wireless telephone tracking is likely to impose 
substantial costs on society. Although it is difficult to assess their magnitude, a strong argument 
can be made that they probably outweigh the benefits of non-regulation. In any case, it is clear 
that unregulated electronic tracking is much more costly than unregulated infrared searching. 
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220 See e.g. Criminal Code, § 195; 18 U.S.C. § 3126 (2006). 
Infrared searches reveal very little about what is happening inside people’s homes. They simply 
indicate that an area, room, or building is substantially hotter than its surroundings. Combined 
with other information, this may provide a simple and reliable indicator that a structure is being 
used for a specific, criminal purpose. GPS and wireless telephone tracking systems, in contrast, 
reveal a great deal of information about non-criminal behaviour. The disclosure of this 
information to the state that has the potential to lead to substantial avoidance and defensive 
costs221 as well as abusive and discriminatory policing. 
 Decision-making error – The forgoing analysis has demonstrated that the benefits and 
costs associated with the unrestrained governmental use of location tracking technologies are 
both substantial. Which legal institution – legislatures or courts – is best placed to decide which 
side of the ledger should prevail? As in the case of infrared imaging, tracking technologies are 
changing quickly. As discussed, contemporary GPS and wireless tracking systems are much 
more powerful and precise than the primitive beepers considered in Knotts, Karo, and Wise. And 
while it is clear that tracking devices will continue to become more accurate and prevalent, their 
future development cannot be predicted with anything approaching certainty. We do not know, 
for example, how precise or unobtrusive they may eventually become.222 Nor can we predict all 
of the ways in which they will be used by individuals and commercial service providers.223 
221 See Song, supra note 15, at 11-6. 
222 See e.g. MOHINDER S. GREWAL, ET AL., GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEMS, INERTIAL NAVIGATION, AND 
INTEGRATION 71-3 (2001); Alan Cameron & Josh Landers, Taking Up Position in Covert Surveillance, 12 GPS 
WORLD, August 2001, at 10; Michael Shaw, Modernization of the Global Positioning System, 11 GPS WORLD,
September 2000 at 36. 
223 See e.g. The Policeman on Your Dashboard, 376 ECONOMIST, 17 September 2005, at 12; Steven Levy, 
A Future With Nowhere to Hide?, 143 NEWSWEEK, 7 June 2004, at 76; Something to Watch Over You, 364 
ECONOMIST, 17 August 2002, at 61. 
Legislatures are better equipped to respond to this kind of technological flux than courts. As 
discussed, they have better access to technical information and are better placed to weigh voters’ 
preferences on privacy and security concerns.  
 It is distinctly possible, however, that giving legislatures exclusive authority to regulate 
electronic tracking may disproportionately harm the interests of minorities and waste law 
enforcement resources. If this is true, and the private and social costs of these harms are not fully 
visible to legislators, then there may be a representation reinforcement justification for judicial 
intervention. As a result of their familiarity with the criminal investigative process and political 
independence, judges may be better attuned to the disparate impacts of tracking technologies on 
minorities than legislators.  
 If legislatures are better placed than courts to weigh the overall benefits and costs of 
electronic tracking systems, but courts are more likely to account for disproportionate harms to 
minorities, how should judges go about determining the existence and extent of constitutional 
protection from this kind of surveillance? There is no easy answer to this question. It is sensible 
to begin, however, by examining how legislatures in the United States and Canada have dealt 
with location tracking technologies.  
 To date, Congress has not imposed any substantive limitations on the use of location 
tracking devices.224 Police are therefore free to use them without either obtaining a warrant or 
 
224 Congress has restricted the use of location tracking in limited circumstances, however. The wireless 911 
statute specifies that location information collected during 911 calls can only be disclosed for emergency response 
purposes. See the Wireless Communication and Public Safety Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-81, § 5, 113 Stat. 1288 
(Oct. 26, 1999) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 222(f) (2006)). Congress has also declared that the envelope data supplied 
in response to pen/trap orders for wireless devices must not include location data, except insofar as location can be 
determined from telephone numbers. See 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(2)(B) (2006). 
establishing individualized suspicion.225 Karo established, however, that a reasonable 
expectation of privacy is triggered when the installation or monitoring of a tracking device 
intrudes on a constitutionally-protected area, such as a private residence. In such cases police 
must obtain a warrant.226 
A dramatic distinction exists in United States law, then, between tracking in public 
spaces, which is unregulated, and tracking in private spaces, which requires a warrant. Yet as we 
have seen, the use of GPS and wireless telephone tracking in public spaces creates substantial 
social costs. If the decision as to whether to regulate these technologies is left to Congress, there 
is a risk that it will fail to act in a fully representative fashion. But if judges intervene and 
 
225 The few courts that have considered the question of whether warrantless GPS or wireless telephone 
tracking in public spaces violates the Fourth Amendment have all held that it does not. See United States v. Forest, 
355 F.3d 942, 951-53 (6th Cir. 2004) (use of cell site data to determine that suspect had travelled from one 
municipality to another did not invade a reasonable expectation of privacy); United States v. Moran, 349 F. Supp. 2d 
425, 467-68 (N.D. N.Y.) (2005) (use of GPS tracking device on suspect’s vehicle did not invade a reasonable 
expectation of privacy); In re United States for an Order Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register, 405 F. Supp. 2d 435 
(Magis. Ct., S.D.N.Y. 2005) at 449-50 [Application for an Order] (issuance of court order for retrospective cell site 
data associated with calls did not invade reasonable expectation of privacy as location information voluntarily 
disclosed to service provider). However, in Jackson, 76 P.3d 217, at 259-64, the Washington Supreme Court 
concluded that the warrantless use of GPS tracking devices violates the state’s constitution. See also United States v. 
Berry, 300 F. Supp. 2d 366, 367-68 (D. Md. 2004) (noting similarities and differences between beepers and GPS 
tracking devices, but declining to decide whether monitoring of GPS device constituted search); People v. Lacey, 
No. 2463N/02, 2004 WL 1040676, at 4-8 (N.Y. Nassau County Ct. May 6, 2004) (unpublished decision) 
(concluding that installation of GPS device constituted search under both federal and state constitutions, but denying 
application on basis that defendant lacked standing). 
226 A provision of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (18 U.S.C. § 3117(a) (2006)) authorizes 
courts to grant warrants for tracking devices that may move across district boundaries. The provision does not speak 
to the standard for authorizing such warrants. Most courts have held that they must be issued under the authority of 
Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which authorizes searches for evidence on the basis of 
probable cause. See Application for Pen Register, 396 F. Supp. 2d 747; In re United States for an Order Authorizing 
the Use of a Pen Register, 384 F. Supp. 2d 562 (Magis. Ct., E.D.N.Y. 2005), reconsideration denied, 396 F. Supp. 
2d 294 (E.D.N.Y. 2005); In re Application of the United States for an Order Authorizing the Installation and Use of 
a Pen Register and a Caller Identification System on Telephone Numbers (Sealed) and Production of Real Time Cell 
Site Information, 402 F. Supp. 2d 597 (Magis. Ct., D. Md. 2005). But see Application for an Order, 405 F. Supp. 2d 
435 (holding that government may obtain the location of the connecting antenna tower at the beginning and end of 
calls on the basis of the “specific and articulable facts” standard set out in the Stored Communications Act (codified 
at 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2006)). In Karo, 468 U.S.at 718 n.5, the U.S. Supreme Court expressly declined to comment 
on whether electronic tracking in constitutionally protected areas could be justified by reasonable suspicion. 
recognize a reasonable expectation of privacy, there is a risk that they will overestimate the 
benefits and underestimate the costs of regulation. 
 One way to mitigate both of these risks is for courts to recognize an expectation of 
privacy, but require only that police justify tracking on the basis of reasonable suspicion.227 This 
would significantly diminish the potential for discriminatory profiling while maintaining law 
enforcement’s ability to track when they have only a moderate degree of suspicion. If Congress 
determined that the social costs of GPS and wireless telephone tracking justified the use of the 
probable cause standard, it would be free to legislate accordingly. Such a decision would be the 
product of a richer information environment than is generally available to courts.  
 This is essentially the approach taken by the Supreme Court of Canada in Wise. That 
 
227 This standard is typically expressed in United States legislation and jurisprudence as “specific and 
articulable facts.” See e.g. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (authorizing “stop and frisk” searches); Stored 
Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703(c)-(d) (2006) (authorizing government access to non-content subscriber 
records held by service provider). In Canada, the same standard is expressed variously as “articulable cause” (see 
e.g. R. v. Simpson, 12 O.R. (3d) 182 at 199, 200-04 (Ont. C.A.1993)), “reasonable grounds to suspect” or 
“reasonable grounds to detain” (see e.g. R. v. Mann [2004] 3 S.C.R. 59 (Can.) ¶¶ 30, 33, 45), or “reasonable 
suspicion” (see e.g. Criminal Code, §§ 492.1, 492.2). 
 Courts could require governments to meet an even lower standard to justify GPS and wireless telephone 
tracking. The standard of mere “relevance” to a criminal investigation is used, for example, for a number of statutory 
search powers in the United States. See e.g. 12 U.S.C. §§ 3402, 3407, and 3408 (2006) (authorizing orders for 
financial records); 18 U.S.C. § 3123 (2006) (authorizing orders for pen registers and trap and trace devices). Recall, 
however, that these provisions were enacted after the Supreme Court ruled that these searches did not invade a 
reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment. As long as the application meets the formal 
requirements set out in the statute, courts must grant the authorization; they have no authority to undertake an 
independent evaluation of the relevance of the information sought. See In re United States, 846 F. Supp. 1555, 1559 
(M.D. Fla. 1994); United States. v. Fregoso, 60 F.3d 1314, 1320 (8th Cir. 1995). Recall as well that while violations 
of these statutes may result in criminal sanctions, exclusion of evidence is not a remedy. See supra notes 136 and 
140. 
 Even this very limited form of regulation would provide significant protection against discriminatory 
profiling. Requiring police to go to court to obtain an authorization imposes a substantial logistical and economic 
restraints on their ability to arbitrarily select suspects for investigation. It also makes it virtually impossible to 
engage in the kind of mass surveillance of public spaces that GPS and wireless telephone tracking technologies 
make possible. There would likely be little difference in practice, then, between the standards of reasonable 
suspicion and relevance. Police are unlikely to invest the time and resources required to obtain a court authorization 
unless they have at least a reasonable suspicion that tracking will reveal evidence of criminal activity.  
decision considered first generation tracking technology, however. The question that Canadian 
courts now face is whether the legislative response to Wise, which authorizes tracking warrants 
on reasonable suspicion, complies with section 8 of the Charter when applied to GPS and 
wireless telephone tracking.228 As the argument presented above suggests, the answer to this 
question should be “yes.” While GPS and wireless telephone tracking systems impose greater 
costs on society than the beepers considered in Wise, they also have greater benefits. Requiring 
warrants, even on the modest standard of reasonable suspicion, severely limits the risk of 
widespread stereotyping and discrimination. With this protection in place, the task of estimating 
the costs and benefits of tracking technologies and choosing an appropriate scheme to regulate 
them is best left to Parliament.  
 
228 Criminal Code, § 492.1. Another live question is whether this provision authorizes the monitoring of 
tracking devices that were not installed by government agents. The provision permits agents “to install, maintain, 
and remove a tracking device in or on any thing, including a thing carried, used or worn by any person . . . and to 
monitor, or to have monitored, a tracking device installed in or on any thing.” “Tracking device” is defined as “any 
device that, when installed in or on any thing, may be used to help ascertain, by electronic or other means, the 
location of any thing or person.” While the first clause refers to the installation of the device by police, the 
subsequent clauses use the verb “install” in the passive voice, implying that it may be effected by non-state agents. 
From a policy perspective, there would seem little reason to differentiate between devices installed by police and 
those used by commercial service providers. To date, there have been no reported decisions on either the 
interpretation or constitutionality of s. 492.1 in the context of GPS or wireless telephone tracking. See generally R. 
v. T. & T. Fisheries, 2005 CarswellPEI 71 (Prov. Ct.) (WeC) (s. 492.1 warrant used by police to install and monitor 
GPS tracking device); R. v. Gerrard, 2003 CarswellOnt 421 (S.C.J.) (WeC) (police used general investigative 
warrant provision in s. 487.01 of the Code (which requires reasonable and probable grounds) to install and monitor a 
GPS tracking device). 
CONCLUSION 
The reasonable expectation of privacy test does not require a radical overhaul. Courts 
have cast it as a rough cost-benefit calculus and have generally crafted reasonable compromises 
between privacy and crime control interests. The test can undoubtedly be improved, however, 
and economic analysis can play an important role in this, especially as emerging technologies 
threaten the vitality of traditional conceptions of privacy based on secrecy and intimacy.  
 The chief contribution of economics in this area is to provide a more rigorous and 
productive alternative to the moral conception of privacy that courts have conventionally relied 
on in making reasonable expectation of privacy decisions. Unlike the moral approach, the 
economic approach does not justify protecting privacy for its own sake, but rather because it 
often enhances social welfare by diminishing avoidance, defensive, and suboptimal enforcement 
costs. Economic analysis also suggests, however, that courts should refuse to recognize a 
reasonable expectation of privacy when doing so would generate few of these costs, but would 
significantly enhance deterrence. Economics and public choice theory can also reduce decision-
making error by identifying the circumstances in which courts should be especially deferential to 
legislative choice, i.e. where a search technology is novel, technically complex, and undergoing 
rapid change and its costs are borne by a broad swath of the population.  
 By these standards, infrared searches do not invade a reasonable expectation of privacy. 
They provide police with a powerful investigative tool, thereby enhancing the deterrence of 
crime, without producing (to any significant extent) the costs associated with the avoidance of 
productive activity, the prevention of privacy intrusions, the enforcement of inefficient criminal 
prohibitions, or the profiling of vulnerable minorities. The economic approach confirms that the 
Supreme Court of Canada in Tessling (and not the majority of the United States Supreme Court 
in Kyllo) correctly concluded that warrantless infrared searches are constitutional. It also 
suggests that courts should defer to legislatures in deciding whether and how to regulate future, 
potentially more intrusive infrared technologies, so long as these technologies do not 
disproportionately harm minorities.  
 The case for recognizing a reasonable expectation of privacy in relation to GPS and 
wireless telephone tracking is much stronger. The privacy costs associated with these 
technologies are substantially greater than for infrared searches. Location tracking has the 
potential to produce substantial avoidance and defensive costs. It may also increase the risk of 
discriminatory profiling. The case for legislative deference is also weaker for GPS and wireless 
telephone tracking than for infrared searches. The complexity and rapid development of tracking 
technologies militate in favour of legislative regulation; but legislatures are unlikely to fully 
account for disproportionate impacts on minority suspects. The best solution may thus be for 
courts to recognize a minimal expectation of privacy that would require warrants based on 
reasonable suspicion. This would provide considerable protection against discriminatory 
profiling without usurping the legislature’s capacity to determine the need for more extensive 
regulation. 
